_Soc._ And does any one desire to be miserable and ill-fated? _Men._ I should say not, Socrates. _Soc._ But if there is no one who desires to be miserable, there is no one, Meno, who desires evil; for what is misery but the desire and possession of evil? _Men._ That appears to be the truth, Socrates, and I admit that nobody desires evil. _Soc._ And yet, were you not saying just now that virtue is the desire and power of attaining good? _Men._ Yes, I did say so. [Sidenote: _The self-contradiction of Meno._] [Sidenote: The desire of good is really common to all of them.] _Soc._ But if this be affirmed, then the desire of good is common to all, and one man is no better than another in that respect? _Men._ True. _Soc._ And if one man is not better than another in desiring good, he must be better in the power of attaining it? _Men._ Exactly. [Sidenote: Virtue is the power of attaining good with justice.] _Soc._ Then, according to your definition, virtue would appear to be the power of attaining good? _Men._ I entirely approve, Socrates, of the manner in which you now view this matter. _Soc._ Then let us see whether what you say is true from another point of view; for very likely you may be right:—You affirm virtue to be the power of attaining goods? _Men._ Yes. _Soc._ And the goods which you mean are such as health and wealth and the possession of gold and silver, and having office and honour in the state—those are what you would call goods? _Men._ Yes, I should include all those. _Soc._ Then, according to Meno, who is the hereditary friend of the great king, virtue is the power of getting silver and gold; and would you add that they must be gained piously, justly, or do you deem this to be of no consequence? And is any mode of acquisition, even if unjust or dishonest, equally to be deemed virtue? _Men._ Not virtue, Socrates, but vice. _Soc._ Then justice or temperance or holiness, or some other part of virtue, as would appear, must accompany the acquisition, and without them the mere acquisition of good will not be virtue. _Men._ Why, how can there be virtue without these? _Soc._ And the non-acquisition of gold and silver in a dishonest manner for oneself or another, or in other words the want of them, may be equally virtue? _Men._ True. _Soc._ Then the acquisition of such goods is no more virtue than the non-acquisition and want of them, but whatever is accompanied by justice or honesty is virtue, and whatever is devoid of justice is vice. 79 [Sidenote: _The whole cannot be defined by a part._] [Sidenote: But this definition repeats the thing defined:—virtue = the power of attaining good with a part of virtue.] _Men._ It cannot be otherwise, in my judgment.