“Thy words, and my understanding which follows,” replied I to him, “have revealed love to me; but that has made me more full of doubt. For if love is offered to us from without, and if with other foot the soul go not, if strait or crooked she go is not her own merit.”[1] And he to me, “So much as reason seeth here can I tell thee; beyond that await still for Beatrice; for it is a work of faith. Every substantial form that is separate from matter, and is united with it,[2] has a specific virtue residing in itself which without action is not perceived, nor shows itself save by its effect, as by green leaves the life in a plant. Yet, whence the intelligence of the first cognitions comes man doth not know, nor whence the affection for the first objects of desire, which exist in you even as zeal in the bee for making honey: and this first will admits not desert of praise or blame. Now in order that to this every other may be gathered,[3] the virtue that counsels [4] is innate in you, and ought to keep the threshold of assent. This is the principle wherefrom is derived the reason of desert in you, according as it gathers in and winnows good and evil loves. Those who in reasoning went to the foundation took note of this innate liberty, wherefore they bequeathed morals[5] to the world. Assuming then that every love which is kindled within you arises of necessity, the power exists in you to restrain it. This noble virtue Beatrice calls the free will, and therefore see that thou have it in mind, if she take to speaking of it with thee.” [1] If love be aroused in the soul by an external object, and if it be natural to the soul to love, how does she deserve praise or blame for loving? [2] The substantial form is the soul, which is separate from matter but united with it. [3] In order that every other will may conform with the first, that is, with the affection natural to man for the primal objects of desire. [4] The faculty of reason, the virtue which counsels and on which free will depends, is “the specific virtue” of the soul. [5] The rules of that morality which would have no existence were it not for freedom of the will.