Some well-meaning people, when they wish to persuade their fellow-countrymen either by pen or by speech, to adopt a certain course, if they can claim the authority of any good writers favouring their opinions, straightway assume that their own arguments are sufficiently supported to ensure their proposal being carried out. This assurance, however, is checked sometimes by reflection, sometimes by experience. Wise reflection may foresee that the special circumstances of the country will not admit of the proposed change, or after some trial the unsuitability may be shown by experience. So that in cases where authorities persuade, and circumstances control, those who would use earlier writers to maintain their credit must always keep in view the application to particular conditions. I see many people of good intelligence, considerable reading, and facility of expression, both abroad and at home, fall into great error by neglecting special circumstances, and overstraining the force of authority. In dealing with education, must I entreat my country to be content with this because such a one commends it, or force her to that because such a State approves of it? The show of right deceives us, and the likeness of unlike things doth lead us where it listeth. For the better understanding with what wariness authority is to be used, let it be considered that there are two sorts of authors that we deal with in our studies. Of the one kind are writers on the mathematical sciences, who proceed by the necessity of a demonstrable subject, and enforce the conclusions by inevitable argument. Of the other kind are writers on the moral and political sciences, who, dealing with human affairs, must have regard to the circumstances of every particular case. With the former the truth of the subject-matter maintains itself, without the need for any personal authority, and is beyond debate; it is with the latter that controversy arises, the writer’s credit often authorising the thing, and in this case great injustice may be done by quoting without discrimination as to difference of circumstance. It is no proof that because Plato praiseth something, because Aristotle approveth it, because Cicero commends it, because Quintilian or anyone else is acquainted with it, therefore it is for us to use. What if our country honour it in them, and yet for all that may not use it herself, because the circumstances forbid? Nay, what if the writers’ authority be cited without considering in what circumstances the opinion was originally expressed? Is not a great wrong done by him who wresteth the meaning of the author he quotes? He that will deal with writers so as to turn their conclusions to the use of his country must be very well advised, and diligently mark that their meaning and his application are consistent, and must consider how much of their opinion his country will admit. Whether I shall myself be able to carry out what I demand from