13. Sixthly, of names, some are _absolute_, others _relative_. _Relative_ are such as are imposed for some comparison, as _father_, _son_, _cause_, _effect_, _like_, _unlike_, _equal_, _unequal_, _master_, _servant_, _&c._ And those that signify no comparison at all are _absolute names_. But, as it was noted above, that universality is to be attributed to words and names only, and not to things, so the same is to be said of other distinctions of names; for no things are either _univocal_ or _equivocal_, or _relative_ or _absolute_. There is also another distinction of names into _concrete_ and _abstract_; but because abstract names proceed from proposition, and can have no place where there is no affirmation, I shall speak of them hereafter. [Sidenote: Simple and compounded names.] 14. Lastly, there are _simple_ and _compounded names_. But here it is to be noted, that a name is not taken in philosophy, as in grammar, for one single word, but for any number of words put together to signify one thing; for among philosophers _sentient animated body_ passes but for one name, being the name of every living creature, which yet, among grammarians, is accounted three names. Also a _simple name_ is not here distinguished from a _compounded name_ by a preposition, as in grammar. But I call a _simple name_, that which in every kind is the most common or most universal; and that a _compounded name_, which by the joining of another name to it, is made less universal, and signifies that more conceptions than one were in the mind, for which that latter name was added. For example, in the conception of _man_ (as is shown in the former chapter.) First, he is conceived to be something that has extension, which is marked by the word _body_. _Body_, therefore, is a _simple name_, being put for that first single conception; afterwards, upon the sight of such and such motion, another conception arises, for which he is called an _animated body_; and this I here call a _compounded name_, as I do also the name _animal_, which is equivalent to an _animated body_. And, in the same manner, an _animated rational body_, as also a _man_, which is equivalent to it, is a more compounded name. And by this we see how the composition of conceptions in the mind is answerable to the composition of names; for, as in the mind one idea or phantasm succeeds to another, and to this a third; so to one name is added another and another successively, and of them all is made one _compounded_ name. Nevertheless we must not think bodies which are without the mind, are compounded in the same manner, namely, that there is in nature a body, or any other imaginable thing existent, which at the first has no magnitude, and then, by the addition of magnitude, comes to have quantity, and by more or less quantity to have density or rarity; and again, by the addition of figure, to be figurate, and after this, by the injection of light or colour, to become lucid or coloured;