2. Errors which happen in reasoning, that is, in syllogizing, consist either in the falsity of the premises, or of the inference. In the first of these cases, a syllogism is said to be faulty in the _matter_ of it; and in the second case, in the _form_. I will first consider the matter, namely, how many ways a proposition may be false; and next the form, and how it comes to pass, that when the premises are true, the inference is, notwithstanding, false. Seeing, therefore, that proposition only is true, (chap, III, art. 7) in which are copulated two names of one and the same thing; and that always false, in which names of different things are copulated, look how many ways names of different things may be copulated, and so many ways a false proposition may be made. Now, all things to which we give names, may be reduced to these four kinds, namely, _bodies_, _accidents_, _phantasms_, and _names_ themselves; and therefore, in every true proposition, it is necessary that the names copulated, be both of them names of _bodies_, or both names of _accidents_, or both names of _phantasms_, or both names of _names_. For names otherwise copulated are incoherent, and constitute a false proposition. It may happen, also, that the name of a _body_, of an _accident_, or of a _phantasm_, may be copulated with the name of a _speech_. So that copulated names may be incoherent seven manner of ways. 1. If the name of a Body } { the name of an Accident. 2. If the name of a Body } { the name of a Phantasm. 3. If the name of a Body } be { the name of a Name. 4. If the name of an Accident } copulated { the name of a Phantasm. 5. If the name of an Accident } with { the name of a Name. 6. If the name of a Phantasm } { the name of a Name. 7. If the name of a Body, } { the name of a Speech. Accident, or Phantasm } { Of all which I will give some examples. [Sidenote: Examples of the first manner of incoherency.] 3. After the first of these ways propositions are false, when abstract names are copulated with concrete names; as (in Latin and Greek) _esse est ens_, _essentia est ens_, τὸ τί ἦν ειναὶ (_i._); _quidditas est ens_, and many the like, which are found in Aristotle's _Metaphysics_. Also, the _understanding worketh_, the _understanding understandeth_, the _sight seeth_; a _body_ is _magnitude_, a _body_ is _quantity_, a _body_ is _extension_; to _be a man_ is a _man_, _whiteness_ is a _white thing_, &c.; which is as if one should say, the _runner_ is the _running_, or the _walk walketh_. Moreover, _essence_ is _separated_, _substance_ is _abstracted_: and others like these, or derived from these, (with which common philosophy abounds.) For seeing no _subject_ of an _accident_ (that is, no _body_) is an _accident_: no name of an _accident_ ought to be given to a _body_, nor of a _body_ to an _accident_. [Sidenote: The second.]