4. False, in the second manner, are such propositions as these; a _ghost is a body_, or a _spirit_, that is, a thin body; _sensible species fly up and down in the air_, or _are moved hither and thither_, which is proper to bodies; also, a _shadow is moved_, or _is a body_; _light is moved_, or _is a body_; _colour is the object of sight_, _sound of hearing_; _space_ or _place is extended_; and innumerable others of this kind. For seeing ghosts, sensible species, a shadow, light, colour, sound, space, &c. appear to us no less sleeping than waking, they cannot be things without us, but only phantasms of the mind that imagines them; and therefore the names of these, copulated with the names of bodies, cannot constitute a true proposition. [Sidenote: The third.] 5. False propositions of the third kind, are such as these; _genus est ens_, _universale est ens_, _ens de ente prædicatur_. For _genus_, and _universale_, and _predicare_, are names of names, and not of things. Also, _number is infinite_, is a false proposition; for no number can be infinite, but only the word _number_ is then called an indefinite name when there is no determined number answering to it in the mind. [Sidenote: The fourth.] 6. To the fourth kind belong such false propositions as these, _an object is of such magnitude or figure as appears to the beholders_; _colour, light, sound, are in the object_; and the like. For the same object appears sometimes greater, sometimes lesser, sometimes square, sometimes round, according to the diversity of the distance and medium; but the true magnitude and figure of the thing seen is always one and the same; so that the magnitude and figure which appears, is not the true magnitude and figure of the object, nor anything but phantasm; and therefore, in such propositions as these, the names of accidents are copulated with the names of phantasms. [Sidenote: The fifth.] 7. Propositions are false in the fifth manner, when it is said that _the definition is the essence of a thing_; _whiteness_, or some other accident, _is the genus, or universal_. For definition is not the essence of any thing, but a speech signifying what we conceive of the essence thereof; and so also not whiteness itself, but the word whiteness, is a genus, or an universal name. [Sidenote: The sixth.] 8. In the sixth manner they err, that say the _idea of anything is universal_; as if there could be in the mind an image of a man, which were not the image of some one man, but a man simply, which is impossible; for every idea is one, and of one thing; but they are deceived in this, that they put the _name_ of the thing for the _idea_ thereof. [Sidenote: The seventh.]