7. For the _manner_ by which we take notice of a conception _past_, we are to remember, that in the _definition_ of _imagination_, it is said to be a conception by _little_ and _little decaying_, or growing more _obscure_. An _obscure_ conception is that which representeth the _whole object_ together, but _none_ of the _smaller parts_ by themselves; and as _more_ or _fewer_ parts be represented, so is the conception or representation said to be _more_ or _less clear_. Seeing then the _conception_, which when it was _first_ produced by sense, was _clear_, and represented the _parts_ of the object _distinctly_; and when it cometh _again_ is _obscure_, we find _missing_ somewhat that we expected; by which we judge it _past_ and _decayed_. For example, a man that is present in a foreign _city_, seeth not only _whole_ streets, but can also distinguish particular _houses_, and _parts_ of houses; but departed thence, he cannot distinguish them so particularly in his mind as he did, some _house_ or turning escaping him; yet is this to _remember_: when _afterwards_ there escape him _more_ particulars, this is also to _remember_, but _not_ so well. In process of time, the _image_ of the city _returneth_ but as a _mass_ of building _only_, which is _almost_ to have _forgotten_ it. Seeing then remembrance is _more_ or _less_, as we find more or less _obscurity_, why may not we well think _remembrance_ to be nothing else but the _missing of parts_, which every man expecteth should succeed after they have a conception of the whole? To see at a great distance of place, and to remember at a great distance of time, is to have like conceptions of the thing: for there wanteth distinction of parts in both; the one conception being weak by operation at distance, the other by decay. [Sidenote: Why in a dream a man never thinks he dreams.] 8. And from this that hath been said, there followeth, that a man can _never know_ he _dreameth_; he _may_ dream he _doubteth_, whether it be a dream or no: but the clearness of the imagination representeth every thing with as many parts as doth sense itself, and consequently, he can take notice of nothing but as present; whereas to think he dreameth, is to think those his conceptions, that is to say dreams, obscurer than they were in the sense: so that he must think them both as clear, and not as clear as sense; which is impossible. [Sidenote: Why few things seem strange in dreams.] 9. From the same ground it proceedeth, that men _wonder not_ in their dreams at place and persons, as they would do waking: for waking, a man would think it strange to be in a place where he never was before, and remember nothing of how he came there; but in a dream, there cometh little of that kind into consideration. The _clearness_ of conception in a dream, taketh away _distrust_, unless the _strangeness_ be _excessive_, as to think himself fallen from on high without hurt, and then most commonly he _waketh_.