[Sidenote: That a dream may be taken for reality and vision.] 10. Nor is it _impossible_ for a man to be so far deceived, as when his dream is _past_, to think it real: for if he dream of such things as are ordinarily in his mind, and in such order as he useth to do waking, and withal that he laid him down to sleep in the place where he findeth himself when he awaketh; all which may happen: I know no κριτήριον or mark by which he can discern whether it were a dream or not, and therefore do the less wonder to hear a man sometimes to tell his dream for a truth, or to take it for a vision. ------- CHAPTER IV. 1. Discourse. 2. The cause of coherence of thoughts. 3. Ranging. 4. Sagacity. 5. Reminiscence. 6. Experience. 7. Expectation. 8. Conjecture. 9. Signs. 10. Prudence. 11. Caveats of concluding from experience. [Sidenote: Discourse.] 1. The _succession_ of conceptions in the mind, series or consequence of one after another, may be _casual_ and incoherent, as in dreams for the most part; and it may be _orderly_, as when the former thought introduceth the latter; and this is _discourse_ of the mind. But because the word discourse is commonly taken for the _coherence_ and consequence of words, I will, to avoid equivocation, call it _discursion_. [Sidenote: The cause of coherence of thoughts.] 2. The _cause_ of the _coherence_ or consequence of one conception to another, is their first _coherence_ or consequence at that _time_ when they are produced by sense: as for example, from St. Andrew the mind runneth to St. Peter, because their names are read together; from St. Peter to a _stone_, for the same cause; from _stone_ to _foundation_, because we see them together; and for the same cause, from foundation to _church_, and from church to _people_, and from people to _tumult_: and according to this example, the mind may run almost from anything to anything. But as in the _sense_ the conception of cause and effect may succeed one another; so may they after sense in the _imagination_: and for the most part they do so; the _cause_ whereof is the _appetite_ of them, who, having a conception of the _end_, have next unto it a conception of the next _means_ to that end: as, when a man, from a thought of _honour_ to which he hath an appetite, cometh to the thought of _wisdom_, which is the next means thereunto; and from thence to the thought of _study_, which is the next means to wisdom. [Sidenote: Ranging.] 3. To omit that kind of discursion by which we proceed from anything to anything, there are of the _other_ kind _divers_ sorts: as first, in the _senses_ there are certain coherences of conceptions, which we may call _ranging_; examples whereof are; a man casteth his _eye_ upon the _ground_, to look about for some _small_ thing lost; the _hounds_ casting about at a fault in hunting; and the _ranging_ of spaniels: and herein we take a beginning arbitrary.