Now the explicit Subject in Judgment or the grammatical Subject in Proposition does not always set out the full nature of this, but merely some mark or point in it which we wish to insist upon. So that we may find in Judgment almost anything serving as explicit Subject. Thus, as Aristotle said quite plainly and sensibly, it is natural to say “The horse is white,” but we _may_ have occasion to say “This white is a horse”; it depends on the way in which the Subject comes into our minds. [1] Usually the Subject will be what Dr. Venn calls the heavier term, _i.e._ the term with more connotation. When there is no difference of concreteness between parts and whole, the Judgment becomes reversible as in the equation 7 + 5 = 12. There is no distinction here between Subject and Predicate. The real underlying unity or Subject is the numerical system. [1] See Prof. Bain, p. 56, upon the Universe, and Universe of Discourse, _i.e._ the general subject which you have in your mind. Therefore by recognising Subject and Predicate we represent the organisation of knowledge, and the connection of inherence or consequence within the content of our knowledge. If we do not recognise this distinction we throw the whole of Judgment into an undifferentiated mass of fact, running all assertion into the same mould, “It is the case that,” etc. One difficulty still remains. If the relation between Subject and Predicate is within an idea, and not between ideas--that is, if the whole explicit content, Subject and {110} Predicate together, can be regarded as predicated of reality,--why is the act of predication expressed by a verb, _i.e._ a sign of activity within this content? Why is a verb often if not always the form of predication which connotes Subject and Predicate? Not because it is a time-word. On the contrary, we want to get rid of the tense in Logic. The time of a Judgment ought to be determined only by the special connection between Subject and Predicate, not by tense, because tense is always subjective, merely relative to the time of speaking, and is accidental to the content of Judgment. Action seems nearer to what we want; the _verb_ expresses both action and predicate. But the _idea_ of action again does not make a predication, and the verb “is” does not _really indicate_ action. Perhaps it is the demonstrative element in a finite verb that makes it the vehicle of predication, _i.e._ in a finite verb you have a meaning referred by a demonstrative element to something else. Originally the meaning was always an action; “is” of course meant “breathes.” But now the verb has lost vitality by wear and tear, and only refers something to something else. The puzzle is that the Judgment is not referred to us who make it, but is expressed as if it was accomplished by something outside us. That puzzle points to the essential feature which we insisted on, viz. its objectivity; in predication we refer what is mentally our act to a