The Ethics of Medical Homicide and MutilationO'Malley, Austin
Religion
The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation
O'Malley, Austin
Medical ethics
In a just war a commander may shell an enemy's works and indirectly
thereby kill non-combatants. The gunners that cause the death of the
non-combatants do not intend this death; they permit it as the evil
effect which comes immediately with the good effect (the capture of
the works) from the causal act of firing the guns.
If we keep within the bounds of a just defence we may protect
ourselves against an unjust aggressor to the effusion of his blood,
or even, if need be, to killing him. An aggressor is any one who
does injury to us contrary to our rights and the ordination of
right. A formally unjust aggressor is a sane intelligent person who
intentionally attacks us; a materially unjust aggressor is one who
is not intelligent, not responsible, as an insane person, a child,
or a sane person who is injuring us unintentionally. This question
is important in medicine because the fetus _in utero_ is often
erroneously called an unjust aggressor.
It is a primary law of nature that every human being should and will
strive to resist injury and destruction. Justice requires a moral
equation, and if one right prevails over another it must be superior
to the right it supersedes. At the outset both the aggressor and
the intended victim have equal rights to life, but the fact that
the aggressor uses his own life for the destruction of a fellow man
sets the aggressor in a condition of juridic inferiority to the
victim. The moral power of the aggressor here is equal to his inborn
right to life, _less_ the unrighteous use he makes of it; while the
moral power of the intended victim remains in its integrity, and has
therefore a higher juridic value.
The right of self-defence is not annulled by the fact that the
aggressor is irresponsible. The absence of knowledge saves him
from moral guilt, but it does not alter the character of the act
considered objectively; it is yet an unjust aggression, and in the
conflict the life assailed has still a superior juridic value. In
any case the right of wounding or of killing in self-defence is
not based on the ill will of the aggressor, but on the illegitimate
character of the aggression.
The condition's of a blameless defence (_moderamen inculpatae
tutelae_) are: (1) that the aggressor really threatens the defender's
life, and there is no means of offsetting that violence except like
violence; (2) that no more violence is used than is adequately
required: if the aggression can be stopped by wounding the aggressor
the defender is not to kill him; (3) that the violence in the defence
is used with the intention of defence, not in revenge, hatred, anger,
or the like motives.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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