The Ethics of Medical Homicide and MutilationO'Malley, Austin
Religion
The Ethics of Medical Homicide and Mutilation
O'Malley, Austin
Medical ethics
Suppose two swimmers, Peter and Paul, are trying to save Thomas, who
dies in the water; as he dies Thomas grips Peter and Paul so tightly
that they cannot shake the corpse off. Peter is weak, and he will
soon sink and drown, owing to his weakness and the weight of the
corpse; Paul also will go down later, owing to the weight of Peter
and Thomas. Peter, however, cuts his own clothing loose from the grip
of the corpse and is saved; but Paul immediately is drowned, owing
to the fact that the full weight of the corpse comes upon him. Is
Peter justified in cutting himself loose? Certainly he is. This is an
example of indirect killing, a case of double effect, one good, the
saving of Peter's life, the other evil, the loss of Paul's life, both
proceeding immediately and equally from the causal act, the cutting
loose of the clothing. The good effect is intended, the bad effect is
reluctantly permitted.
Again, let us set the same condition for Peter, Paul, and Thomas; but
Peter is not able to cut himself loose. John, a fourth person, can
cut Peter loose and save him, but can do no more; he must let Paul go
down with the corpse of Thomas. May John cut Peter loose? Certainly
he may, on the principle _quod liceat per se licet per alium_. This
is another case of double effect, with the extenuating circumstances
as above.
Suppose, however, Peter represents a living infant in the womb
of Ann, and that she is in labor; further, this infant cannot be
delivered owing to the contraction of Ann's pelvis. May John, a
physician, cut away Peter by craniotomy and so save Ann's life?
Certainly he may _not_. John here _directly_ brains Peter to save
Ann, although Peter is not an unjust aggressor; he does a murder to
get a good effect, and the end does not justify the means. There are
two effects, but the good effect follows from the bad one, and not
immediately from the causal act.
Take another example: Peter is a swimmer disabled by cramps and about
to drown; Paul, going to save Peter, is seized by Peter, and both
are now in danger of drowning; John goes to help Peter and Paul.
He cannot get Peter's grip loose by ordinary means, and he sees he
can save only one man, either Peter or Paul. May John knock Peter
senseless to loosen his grip from Paul, bring in Paul, and thus leave
Peter to drown? Certainly he may. You have the double effect here
also. Moreover, Peter is a materially unjust aggressor; he is like a
maniac trying to kill Paul. In the craniotomy case the child is not
a materially or formally unjust aggressor, it is not doing anything
at all. It is where the mother put it, and it has a full right to its
position and its life.
John most probably might also knock Paul senseless and save Peter,
if through affection or similar motive he preferred this course.
He would then be justified by the double-effect principle alone,
although Paul is in no sense an aggressor. The intention of the blow
would have to be solely to loosen Paul's hold.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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