These parents were criminally guilty of grave neglect in permitting the mutilation of the heart and ears. [11] _Theol. Moral._, lib. 7, cap. 5, disp. 4, n. 365. [12] _Ibid._, n. 378. [13] _Ibid._, n. 382. Any notable mutilation inflicted upon oneself is akin to the malice of suicide, and when perpetrated on another it is related to homicide. The dominion over the members of the body, as over the whole body, belongs to God alone. Man is constituted by his parts, members, taken together, and if he were master of his members he would be master of himself. Again, each member of the body is naturally united to that body and ordained for determined organic functions; so it is wrong to render these members unfit for their natural function or to separate them from the body, unless such actions are necessary for the preservation of life itself. Although man is not master of himself, he is the administrator of himself; and therefore when the amputation of any member is necessary for the preservation of the life of the whole body it is licit to subordinate this part to the good of the whole. A direct mutilation is one intended as an end, or as a means to an end; it is a voluntary and free act. An indirect mutilation is one in which the mutilation is the natural effect of the act, but the intention of the agent is directed toward another end. The mutilation follows indirectly from the activity of the will, but there is a satisfying proportion between the accidental effect (the mutilation) and the end intended. In such an act there are two effects which follow the causal act _aeque immediate_, or directly (not indirectly, that is, not all from the other effect, but each immediately from this cause): one effect is good (to save life, avoid unbearable pain, or the like), and the other evil (the mutilation), but the good effect is the end intended, the evil effect is reluctantly permitted. Such an act is licit provided the usual conditions of the double effect are present, that is: 1. The action that is the cause of the good and bad effects must be itself good or indifferent morally. 2. The good and the bad effects must each be an immediate result of the causal act; the good effect may be not so subordinated to the evil effect as to be obtainable only through the evil effect. 3. The bad effect must not be intended, either immediately or remotely; it may at most be tolerated as unavoidable. 4. There must be a sufficiently grave reason for the act.