Indirect mutilation may be licit when the evil to be avoided is proportional to the mutilation. Direct mutilation, where there is one direct effect of, say, the surgical operation, namely, to remove the somatic organ, is not licit, except for the good of the whole body; and that good to the whole body must be juridically equivalent to the damage done the body by the mutilation. There is to be a direct effect in such mutilation, which is the good of the whole body. It is not permitted to kill directly to save the life of another, but it is permissible to mutilate directly to save the whole body. Direct mutilation, however, is never unavoidable because the agent can always correctly order his intention before the operation. All direct mutilation, unless for the good of the whole body, implies deordination: it offends against the supreme dominion of God, who reserves to himself, as Creator, ownership of human life and its organs. As we may not destroy life, which belongs to God, we may not amputate a member to suppress any vital function. The exception which permits us to mutilate a member or organ is, as has been said, the adequate good of the whole body. The reason for this is that man is the administrator of his members, to the good of the whole person. Each member is not for itself but for the whole body. The good of the body is the sole cause that renders direct mutilation licit. The members of the body by their nature are not immediately subordinate to anything except the conservation of the total natural good, or that of the body. Therefore direct mutilation is not permissible to effect immediately spiritual good, or the good of the soul. We may not castrate a man, or do vasectomy on him, to preserve his continence, because there is no immediate subordination and connection between the members of the body and the salvation of the soul. Moreover, as St. Thomas says,[14] "Spiritual health can always be preserved by means other than amputation of bodily members," that is, through moderating by the will the use of these members. If a mutilation that immediately conduces to the good of the whole body, happens also to do good to the soul, this second effect is then legitimate. (The various mutilations of the body by surgical operations will be considered separately hereafter.) [14] 2, 2, q. lxv, a. 1, ad 3. May the state, then, sterilize criminals, and persons afflicted with dangerous hereditary diseases, to prevent the propagation of moral and physical defectives? This question is considered specially in another chapter.