On August 29 Mr. Asquith in the House of Commons announced a wonderful feat of arms by the British army. It was with reference to the engagement in the neighbourhood of Cambrai—Le Cateau on Wednesday, August 26, which Sir John French described as “the most critical day of all.” There must have been at the lowest computation 300,000 German troops (five German Army Corps, two Cavalry Divisions, and a reserve corps, with the Guard Cavalry and the 2nd Cavalry Division) opposed to two British Army Corps and a Division. The total strength of our forces cannot have exceeded 100,000 men. In other words, the odds were three to one, and were probably much heavier. Our 2nd Army Corps and 4th Division bore the brunt of the cavalry attack, whilst our 1st Army Corps was attacked on the right and inflicted very heavy loss on the enemy. Our casualties were also heavy. General Joffre, in a message published that morning, had conveyed his congratulations and thanks for the protection so effectively given by our Army to the French flank. CHAPTER V SIR JOHN FRENCH ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH ARMY TO AUGUST 28— LORD KITCHENER ON THE FOUR DAYS’ BATTLE—FIGHTING IN THE VALLEY OF THE MEUSE—CHARLEVILLE. The following extract from Sir John French’s first despatch brings it to a conclusion as far as the operations of the British army are concerned:— During the fighting on the 24th and 25th the Cavalry became a good deal scattered, but by the early morning of the 26th General Allenby had succeeded in concentrating two brigades to the south of Cambrai. The 4th Division was placed under the orders of the General Officer commanding the Second Army Corps. On the 24th the French Cavalry Corps, consisting of three divisions, under General Sordêt, had been in billets north of Avesnes. On my way back from Bavai, which was my “Poste de Commandement” during the fighting of the 23rd and 24th, I visited General Sordêt, and earnestly requested his co-operation and support. He promised to obtain sanction from his Army Commander to act on my left flank, but said that his horses were too tired to move before the next day. Although he rendered me valuable assistance later on in the course of the retirement, he was unable for the reasons given to afford me any support on the most critical day of all, viz., the 26th. At daybreak it became apparent that the enemy was throwing the bulk of his strength against the left of the position occupied by the Second Corps and the 4th Division. At this time the guns of four German Army Corps were in position against them, and Sir Horace Smith-Dorrien reported to me that he judged it impossible to continue his retirement at daybreak (as ordered) in face of such an attack.