It was evident that the coast States, in the impending emergency, must turn for comfort from the Navy to the War Department, and it soon became most painfully evident that the prospect of obtaining any immediate aid from this quarter was far from reassuring. This especially was true in the case of the New England States, and notably so in that of Massachusetts. To make a broad statement, modern defensive works, modern sea-coast guns, and trained artillerymen to man them, were lacking. In other words, the apathy of thirty years had borne its legitimate fruit: the Congressmen of New England—with honorable exceptions, like Senators Hawley and Lodge—while ever willing to exert themselves in favor of "Protection" of the commercial variety, had been sublimely indifferent to their duty in providing protection of another and very vital sort, and their constituents, in consequence, were enabled to enjoy the sensation of a war-scare which was far from being unwarranted. For it did not require a high order of intellect to comprehend that thirty days would not suffice for the accomplishment of the work of ten years—nor, indeed, could any one furnish a satisfactory guarantee of even thirty days' freedom from attack. THE COAST-DEFENCE PROBLEM IN MASSACHUSETTS II. EARLY in April, when war was imminent, Governor Wolcott, with two officers of his staff, sat down to the study of a war-map of the Massachusetts coast which had been prepared and carefully revised to meet existing conditions. It is no exaggeration to say that this map furnished material for the most serious thought. The map pitilessly showed that from the Merrimac River, on the northern boundary, to the Taunton River, on the southern, there were on navigable waters, open to some of the many forms of naval attack—whether by fleet bombardment, cruiser raid, or torpedo-boat dash—no less than forty-one cities and towns, none with less than one thousand of population, whose inhabitants aggregated one million seventy-seven thousand, or over forty-three per cent. of the population of the State. Furthermore, it appeared that, at a low estimate, the property interests exposed in these towns reached the enormous sum of $1,586,775,000—surely a tempting bait for any adventurous naval commander in the service of a desperate and bankrupt enemy. But the map relentlessly showed more than this: it demonstrated the absolutely defenceless condition of this rich strip of coast. At Boston there were indications of a rudimentary defence; at New Bedford stood the obsolete granite walls of old Fort Rodman; Fall River was protected by the guns at Fort Adams and the batteries at Dutch Island; but elsewhere along the coast there was not to be found even the pretence of preparation for the surely coming war.