The obsolete defenses, however, were not alone in giving cause for grave concern. The question of manning them had to be considered. As a matter of record, there were scattered along the coast from Fort Preble, Me., to Fort Trumbull, Conn., eight batteries—one ("F") a light battery—of the Second Artillery, whose duty-strength on the 16th of April may have been approximately six hundred men. There were but three of these batteries on duty on the Massachusetts coast—"C" (Schenck's) and "M" (Richmond's) at Fort Warren; "G" (Niles') at the yet incomplete battery at Long Island Head, Boston Harbor. Where more trained gunners were to be had was problematical. The bill providing for the organization of the Sixth and Seventh Regiments of regular artillery had been passed by Congress as late as March 7th, and these new commands were only in process of evolution. It was not until the 16th of May that the first of the newly raised batteries took station in New England, and even then its standard of efficiency was low, owing to the heavy percentage of recruits in its ranks. The condition of affairs in Boston Harbor was most interesting. Here was a city with an estimated population of five hundred and fifty thousand; with an assessed valuation of $1,012,750,000; with business interests to be reckoned by daily bank-clearings of $20,000,000; with annual exports and imports of $189,879,839—in short, the second seaport of the country in commercial rank. Naturally it would be expected that the general Government, which hardly could be ignorant of the enormous interests just shown, would have made some pretence at giving them adequate protection. But what were the grim facts in the case? In 1886, the so-called Endicott Board on Fortifications—whose scheme of defence, with some minor modifications, still remains the standard project for the erection of our coast works—recommended an expenditure of $10,910,250 for the defenses of Boston Harbor. This sum covered the cost of guns, mounts, emplacements, submarine mines, and a flotilla of eighteen torpedo-boats for local service. Large as it may seem, it yet represents a levy of but one and seven-hundredths per cent. on the assessed valuation of the property exposed at this port, and furthermore it was intended that its expenditure should be distributed through a period of ten years. How faithfully this programme was carried out by the authorities at Washington may be shown by the following table, in which the first column of figures indicates the number of breech-loading rifles and mortars required by the complete scheme of defence, while the second exhibits those actually mounted for service during the late war: Proposed Mounted