There seems to be some inconsistency on the part of those who refuse to admit of disnaturalisation, yet at the same time maintain that rebellion can be justified. If there is a justification of rebellion, the right of expatriation, or of withdrawal from amongst those who provoke rebellion, must exist; and there can be no doubt that the peaceable withdrawal of those who are oppressed or injured is preferable in the interests of all to armed insurrection. Even Bishop Osorio and Mariana would probably admit that the disnaturalisation of Prim and Serrano would have been better than their treason, which has plunged Spain in anarchy and bloodshed for so many years.[3] Rebellions have almost always been conducted by minorities; and as their justification does not depend upon the numerical importance of those engaged in them, it would follow that in the case of disnaturalisation, where numbers are not requisite, as in the case of armed insurrection, the right would exist equally even if the minority consisted only of one. There are some writers on the Law of Nations, with whom I am agreed in general, who disapprove of the Naturalisation and Disnaturalisation Act of the Session of 1869. I am compelled to differ from them with respect to that measure, for the foregoing reasons, and also because it seems to me that they have lost sight of another circumstance which affects the question. So long as kingly power was a reality, personal allegiance and duty to the sovereign was a reality also. But now that modern innovation and corruption have substituted the rule of majorities for the kingly power, the feeling of the personal duty of the subject is almost lost; and the subject, or citizen, has become only one of an aggregation of individuals, or of an association of persons with equal rights; and each member of such an association has clearly the right to choose whether he will form part of it or not: so that whatever rights of expatriation may have existed in the times of Magellan, Grotius, and Vattel, have become much stronger at the present time, when the conscience of the subject is no longer considered by some as held bound by duty to the sovereign, who has become almost impersonal: instead of loyalty and fealty, we have the duty of fair dealing as between partners and associates on equal terms, as is exemplified by the argumentation of Condorcet in the passage quoted above. That this view is in accordance with the common sense and consent of mankind is shown by the general repudiation of the pretension of the northern portion of the United States to term the secession of the southern states a rebellion; and this pretension was seen to be especially illogical on the part of those who had repudiated the name of rebels when they departed from the duty of obedience to their lawful sovereign.