Just as the task of rebuilding the Fleet had been initiated, a change of Government occurred, and there was reason to fear that the stupendous task of reorganising and re-creating the bases of our naval power would be delayed, if not abandoned. In Lord Fisher the nation had, fortunately, a man of iron will. Though Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, above all things desirous of arresting the rivalry in naval armaments, was Prime Minister, and Lord Tweedmouth was First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Fisher, supported by his colleagues on the Board, insisted on essentials. Delays occurred in German shipbuilding, and the Admiralty agreed that British shipbuilding could be delayed. In 1906, 1907, and 1908 only eight Dreadnoughts were begun. Subsequent events tend to show that this policy was a political mistake, though we eventually obtained more powerful ships by the delay. Germany was encouraged to believe that under a Liberal Administration she could overtake us. _Between 1906 and 1908 inclusive we laid down eight large ships of the Dreadnought type; and Germany laid down nine, and began to accelerate her programme of 1909._ Then occurred a momentous change in British affairs. Lord Tweedmouth, after the famous incident of the German Emperor’s letter, retired from office (1908), and his place was taken by Mr. Reginald McKenna, who was to show that a rigid regard for economy was not incompatible with a high standard of patriotism. In association with the Sea Lords, he surveyed the naval situation. In the following March occurred the naval crisis. Germany had accelerated her construction, and our sea power was in peril. The whole Board of Admiralty determined that there was no room for compromise. Mr. McKenna, it is now no secret, found arrayed against him a large section of the Cabinet when he put forward the stupendous programme of 1909, making provision for eight Dreadnoughts, six protected cruisers, twenty destroyers, and a number of submarines. The naval crisis was accompanied by a Cabinet crisis, in spite of the fact that Sir Edward Grey, as Foreign Secretary, gave the naval authorities his full support. _Unknown to the nation, the Admiralty resigned, and for a time the Navy had no superior authority._ This dramatic act won the day. The Cabinet was converted; the necessity for prompt, energetic action was proved. The most in the way of compromise to which the Board would agree was a postponement in announcing the construction of four of the eight armoured ships. But from the first there was no doubt that, unless there was a sudden change in German policy, the whole octette would be built. When the programme was presented to the House of Commons, the Prime Minister and Sir Edward Grey gave to Mr. McKenna their wholehearted support; either the Government had to be driven from office, or the Liberal Party had to agree to the immense commitment represented in the Navy Estimates. The programme was agreed to.