In a spirit of calmness, patience and courage the British people took up the task which their sense of honour forced upon them all unwillingly. Glancing back over the record of naval progress during the earlier years of the twentieth century we cannot fail to recognise that, in spite of many cross currents and eddies of public opinion, fate had been preparing the British peoples, all unconsciously, for the arbitrament of a war on the issue of which would depend all the interests, tangible and intangible, of the four hundred and forty million subjects of the King--their freedom, their rights to self government, their world-wide trade, and that atmosphere which distinguishes the British Empire from every other empire which has ever existed. In the years of peace men had often asked themselves whether a new crisis would produce the men of destiny to defend the traditions we had inherited from our forefathers. While peace still reigned, they little realised that the men of destiny were quietly, but persistently, working out our salvation. When the hour struck England was fully prepared, confident in her sea power, to take up the gage in defence of all the democracies of the world against the tyrant Power which sought to impose the iron caste of militarism and materialism upon nations that had outgrown mediæval conditions. If we would realise the bearing of British naval policy in the years which preceded the outbreak of war, we shall do well to cast aside all party bias and personal animosities and study the sequence of events after the manner of the historian who collates the material to his hand, analyses it without fear or favour, and sets down his conclusions in all faithfulness. Pursuing this course we are carried back to the year 1897. Since the German Emperor had ascended the throne in 1888, he had endeavoured to communicate to his subjects the essential truths as to the influence of sea power upon history which he had read in Admiral Mahan’s early books. His educational campaign was a failure. In spite of all the efforts of Admiral von Hollmann, the Minister of Marine, the Reichstag refused to vote increased supplies to the Navy. At last, when he had been finally repulsed, first by the Budget Committee and then by the Reichstag itself, Admiral von Hollmann retired admitting defeat. The Emperor found a successor in a naval officer who, then unknown, was in a few years to change radically the opinion of Germans on the value of a fleet. Born on March 19th, 1849, at Custrin, and the son of a judge, Alfred Tirpitz became a naval cadet in 1865, and was afterwards at the Naval Academy from 1874 to 1876. He subsequently devoted much attention to the torpedo branch of the service, and was mainly responsible for the torpedo organisation and the tactical use of torpedoes in the German Navy--a work which British officers regard with admiration.[1] Subsequently he became Inspector of her Torpedo Service,