The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 05: Masterpieces of German Literature Translated into English
Philosophy
The German Classics of the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, Volume 05: Masterpieces of German Literature Translated into English
German literature -- 19th century -- Translations into English; German literature -- 20th century -- Translations into English
Shall I refuse obedience to that inward voice? I will not do it. I
will choose voluntarily the destination which the impulse imputes to
me. And I will grasp, together with this determination, the thought of
its reality and truth, and of the reality of all that it presupposes.
I will hold to the viewpoint of natural thinking, which this impulse
assigns to me, and renounce all those morbid speculations and
refinements of the understanding which alone could make me doubt its
truth. I understand thee now, sublime Spirit![2] I have found the
organ with which I grasp this reality, and with it, probably, all
other reality. Knowledge is not that organ. No knowledge can prove
and demonstrate itself. Every knowledge presupposes a higher as its
foundation, and this upward process has no end. It is Faith, that
voluntary reposing in the view which naturally presents
itself, because it is the only one by which we can fulfil our
destination--this it is that first gives assent to knowledge, and
exalts to certainty and conviction what might otherwise be mere
illusion. It is not knowledge, but a determination of the will to
let knowledge pass for valid. I hold fast, then, forever to this
expression. It is not a mere difference of terms, but a real
deep-grounded distinction, exercising a very important influence on
my whole mental disposition. All my conviction is only faith, and is
derived from a disposition of the mind, not from the understanding.
* * * * *
There is only one point to which I have to direct incessantly all my
thoughts: What I must do, and how I shall most effectually accomplish
what is required of me. All my thinking must have reference to my
doing--must be considered as means, however remote, to this end.
Otherwise, it is an empty, aimless sport, a waste of time and power,
and perversion of a noble faculty which was given me for a very
different purpose.
I may hope, I may promise myself with certainty, that when I think
after this manner, my thinking shall be attended with practical
results. Nature, in which I am to act, is not a foreign being,
created without regard to me, into which I can never penetrate. It is
fashioned by the laws of my own thought, and must surely coincide with
them. It must be everywhere transparent, cognizable, permeable to
me, in its innermost recesses. Everywhere it expresses nothing but
relations and references of myself to myself; and as certainly as
I may hope to know myself, so certainly I may promise myself that I
shall be able to explore it. Let me but seek what I have to seek,
and I shall find. Let me but inquire whereof I have to inquire, and I
shall receive answer.
[Illustration: JOHANN GOTTLIEB FICHTE]
I
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