This is illuminating. It is first stated that our ships bore north and north-east from the enemy and then that the enemy turned to south and south-west, that is, _directly away from the British Fleet_. Thus the fact that the German Fleet turned directly away is confirmed by Germans. No report of this movement of the German Fleet reached me, and at first it was thought that his temporary disappearance was due to the thickening mist, especially as firing could be heard from the battleships in rear, but at 7.41 P.M., the enemy Battle Fleet being no longer in sight from the _Iron Duke_, course was altered “by divisions” three points more to starboard (namely, to south-west) to close the enemy, and single line ahead was again formed on the _Iron Duke_ on that course. At this period the rear of our battle line was still in action at intervals with one or two ships of the enemy’s fleet, which were probably some that had dropped astern partially disabled, but by 7.55 P.M. fire had practically ceased. At about 7.40 P.M. I received a report from Sir David Beatty stating that the enemy bore north-west by west from the _Lion_, distant 10 to 11 miles, and that the _Lion’s_ course was south-west. Although the battle cruisers were not in sight from the _Iron Duke_, I assumed the _Lion_ to be five or six miles ahead of the van of the Battle Fleet, but it appeared later from a report received in reply to directions signalled by me at 8.10 P.M. to the _King George V._ to follow the battle cruisers, that they were not in sight from that ship either. At this time the enemy’s Battle Fleet seems to have become divided, for whilst Sir David Beatty reported the presence of battleships north-west by west from the _Lion_, other enemy battleships were observed to the westward (that is, on the starboard bow of the _Iron Duke_), and the course of the Fleet was at once altered “by divisions” to west in order to close the enemy; this alteration was made at 7.59 P.M. It will be observed that all the large alterations of course of the Battle Fleet during the engagement were made “by divisions” instead of “in succession from the van, or together.” The reason was that in this way the whole Fleet could be brought closer to the enemy with far greater rapidity, and in a more ordered formation, than if the movement had been carried out by the line “in succession.” The objection to altering by turning all ships together was the inevitable confusion that would have ensued as the result of such a manœuvre carried out with a very large Fleet under action conditions in misty weather, particularly if the ships were thus kept on a line of bearing for a long period.