The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and workJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and work
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
Great Britain. Royal Navy; Jutland, Battle of, 1916; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
The German attacks at Jutland did not produce any great effect, and
their importance should not be exaggerated. The turn of the British
Battle Fleet opened the range some 1,750 yards, but _it was not this
turn which led to the difficulty of keeping touch with the enemy_. That
difficulty was due to the fact that the German Fleet made a very large
turn to the westward under cover of a smoke screen at the moment of
launching the earliest destroyer attacks. Neither our battle cruisers
in the van which did not turn away at the time, as it was not necessary
in their case, nor the Battle Fleet, were able to regain touch until
8.20 P.M. because of the retirement of the enemy.
The instructions as to my intentions as the Commander-in-Chief, in
regard to the ranges at which the opening phases of the action should
be fought, remained unaltered, and stress was once more laid on the
policy of keeping the centre and rear of the Battle Fleet outside
torpedo range from the enemy’s battle line _in ordinary circumstances_.
As is very frequently the case when naval actions do not result in
overwhelming material losses by one side or the other, or the capture
or destruction of a large part of the opposing Fleet, both sides at
the time claimed a victory at Jutland, the Germans because they hoped
to support confidence at home and encourage a young Fleet, besides
influencing neutral, and probably in particular American, opinion.
The Germans apparently based their claim on two grounds, the first
being that of having inflicted heavier losses than they received. In
order to make good this contention, the Germans claimed to have sunk
one battleship, one armoured cruiser, three light cruisers, and five
destroyers more than actually were sunk on the British side; and they
concealed, until further concealment was impossible, the sinking of
the battle cruiser _Lutzow_ and the light cruiser _Rostock_, besides
omitting to mention that the _Seydlitz_ had to be beached to prevent
her sinking, thereby slurring over the point that the _Seydlitz_ would
undoubtedly have gone to the bottom as our own _Warrior_ did, had the
action been fought as far from German bases as it was from British
bases. They also said nothing of at least four German battleships being
torpedoed, and of several battleships and all their battle cruisers
being so severely damaged by gunfire as to be incapable of further
fighting for several months. The case was very different with the
British ships, as has been already stated. If these points are borne in
mind, the original German claim to victory falls to the ground, even on
the material side. After the surrender of the German ships in November,
1918, Captain Persius, a reputable and informed writer on naval
matters, stated in the _Berliner Tageblatt_ of November 18th that “our
Fleet’s losses were severe,” adding that “on June 1st, 1916, it was
clear to every thinking person that this battle must, and would be,
the last one.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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