The gradual increase in the size of the Fleet, particularly in light craft, the higher speeds attained by its units, the extreme importance of reducing signalling by wireless at sea to an absolute minimum, except in the presence of the enemy, all tended to concentrate attention on the question of the efficiency of our signal arrangements. Wireless signalling by ships at sea had to be stopped, because by means of _directional_ wireless stations the positions of ships using wireless telegraphy could be determined by the enemy. As time went on, we felt that the enemy might be able to ascertain the class and in some cases even the _name_ of the ship so signalling. This we deduced from the fact that we ourselves made progress in this direction. The fact of a German fleet being at sea, for instance, could hardly be disguised if much use was made of wireless signals. We naturally concluded that the enemy could similarly locate any of our squadrons using the same means of communication. That was an inevitable inference. The foregoing considerations made it necessary, in the first place, to endeavour, by means of carefully compiled and elaborate orders, to reduce the amount of signalling that would ordinarily be required after the Fleet had left its bases. Printed orders were prepared for the Fleet leaving its bases under all the varying conditions that could be anticipated, and whilst this made the orders somewhat lengthy so as to meet every possibility, the object was achieved. Similarly, when the Fleet was in cruising order at sea in daylight, arrangements were made to pass signals in and out between the most advanced cruisers and the Fleet Flagship by searchlight, except in the presence of the enemy, and good organisation gradually reduced the time occupied in this process very considerably. All Fleet manœuvring when much to the southward of the latitude of Kinnaird Head, on the coast of Aberdeen, was also carried out by visual signalling.