The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and work — John Shaqi
The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and workJellicoe, John Rushworth
History
The Grand Fleet, 1914-1916 : $b its creation, development and work
Jellicoe, John Rushworth
Great Britain. Royal Navy; Jutland, Battle of, 1916; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
But it was inevitable that war conditions should make even greater
demands on the skill of the personnel than had previously been
necessary, and in no direction was this more necessary than at night,
the number of ships in company being far greater than had previously
been usual; and the necessity of abstaining from signalling added to
the difficulties. Further, under peace conditions, fleets cruising
on dark, stormy nights without showing any lights, did so for
comparatively short periods, during which the more experienced officers
could, to a certain extent, remain on deck.
Under war conditions no ships at sea ever showed more than a very
dim light at the stern, and frequently not even that, adding greatly
to difficulties of fleet cruising. Consequently provision had to be
made for ensuring safety whilst cruising under these conditions, and
considerable foresight and great skill on the part of officers was
necessary.
Single ships and squadrons that might by any possibility pass close
to one another during hours of darkness were warned beforehand of the
danger, and arrangements made so that they should be aware of each
other’s positions. Destroyers, especially, were given directions so as
to enable them to keep clear of larger vessels which otherwise might
open fire upon them. Patrol craft of all sorts were similarly warned so
far as this was possible, but in their case the conditions, owing to
difficulties of communication, were frequently much more embarrassing.
Finally, the methods of disposing the Fleet at night had to be such as
to reduce to a minimum the necessity for signals, whilst giving freedom
of action in an emergency. What applied to conditions of darkness
applied equally to fog. The ordinary means adopted for ensuring safety
in a fog at sea, the use of the steam syren, could not as a rule be
employed, since the blasts might give warning to the enemy and place
the Fleet open to attack by enemy destroyers or submarines. On the
other hand, the necessity for our destroyers being in close company
with the larger ships for screening purposes against submarines led,
in the case of sudden fog, to a difficult situation, as, before the
Fleet could safely carry out any manœuvre, it was essential to get the
destroyers clear. The sudden descent of fog during zigzagging by the
large ships was also embarrassing. Orders were issued to meet all these
conditions, and the best testimony to the training of the Fleet prior
to the War was the remarkable freedom from accident during the early
months after the opening of hostilities. The manner in which newly
commissioned ships (in many cases ships which were by no means handy
vessels in a fleet) fell into the organisation, was also a source of
great gratification to me, and must have been most satisfactory to the
officers and men concerned.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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