It is difficult to think that the President of the Bavarian Council knew the contents of the Austrian Note while the German Secretary of State at Berlin was kept in ignorance of its terms. Yet, the next day, Herr von Jagow again makes the denial which is forwarded to Paris in the French Ambassador's despatch, dated Berlin, July 24:-- "I asked the Secretary of State to-day in the interview which I had with him if it was correct, as announced in the newspapers, that Austria had presented a Note to the Powers on her dispute with Serbia; if he had received it; and what view he took of it. "Herr von Jagow answered me in the affirmative, adding that the Note was forcible and that he approved it, the Serbian Government having for a long time past wearied the patience of Austria.... _Thereupon I asked him if the Berlin Cabinet had really been entirely ignorant of Austria's requirements before they were communicated to Belgrade, and as he told me that that was so, I showed him my surprise at seeing him thus undertake to support claims, of whose limit and scope he was ignorant.... It is not less striking to notice the pains with which Herr von Jagow and all the officials placed under his orders, pretend to everyone that they were ignorant of the scope of the Note sent by Austria to Serbia._"[86] Confirmation of Germany's complicity is received in a despatch to his Government from the French Ambassador (M. Paul Cambon) in London, dated July 24, 1914:-- "I mentioned the matter to my Russian colleague, who is afraid of a surprise from Germany, and who imagines that Austria would not have despatched her Ultimatum without previous agreement with Berlin. "Count Benckendorff told me that Prince Lichnowsky, when he returned from leave about a month ago, had intimated that he held pessimistic views regarding the relations between St. Petersburg and Berlin. He had observed the uneasiness caused in this latter Capital by the rumours of a naval _entente_ between Russia and England, by the Tsar's visit to Bucharest, and by the strengthening of the Russian Army. Count Benckendorff had concluded from this that a war with Russia would be looked upon without disfavour in Germany. "The Under-Secretary of State has been struck, as all of us have been, by the anxious looks of Prince Lichnowsky since his return from Berlin, and he considers that if Germany had wished to do so, she could have stopped the despatch of the Ultimatum."[87] Again on the same day (July 24, 1914) we have an interesting despatch from the Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs in Paris to the French Ambassadors abroad, detailing what transpired at a visit received from Herr von Schoen (the German Ambassador in Paris), at which the latter twice read (but refused to leave copy of) a note which said:--