The chief blame for this disaster must rest on Howe. His assertion that Philadelphia was the prime object of his campaign made Germain uneasy, and he wrote to him on May 18 that whatever he might meditate, he was not to neglect to co-operate with the northern army.[127] This despatch did not reach Howe until August 16, when he had made co-operation with Burgoyne impossible. A few days later Germain wrote again; the despatch was not ready for his signature at the time at which he wished to go into the country, and when he came back it was forgotten. It was a piece of gross carelessness, but an undue importance has been attached to it.[128] Howe was well aware of Burgoyne's expedition. On June 5 he had received a copy of a despatch from Germain which told him that Burgoyne was ordered to "force his way to Albany" and join him with the utmost speed.[129] Nevertheless, he persisted in pursuing his own plan. He must have hesitated whether to reach Philadelphia by land or water. When in June he at last made up his mind to move, he evidently tried to reach Philadelphia by land. If he had succeeded and had swept Washington before him, he might have kept in communication with Burgoyne and have co-operated with him. Failing in this, he decided to go by sea, and when he was told that he could not safely land in the Delaware, went on to Chesapeake bay. When he gained his object by taking Philadelphia he did so by a course which made it impossible for him to co-operate with Burgoyne, and put Washington's army between them.