On Lake Erie Perry had the moral advantage, such as it was, of making the attack; he had also the physical advantage of a somewhat superior force. But these advantages were more than neutralized by the advantage which the enemy held in being able to concentrate his force to receive the attack and by the very light wind, which was still further deadened by the concussion of great guns after firing began. The lack of wind kept a great part of Perry’s fleet so far in the rear that the flagship near the head of the line had to stand the brunt of the battle--the concentrated fire of about all of the enemy’s squadron. Perry was also handicapped by the unexplained failure of Elliott to close in on the enemy. Commander Ward, in his “Naval Tactics,” written for the instruction of naval cadets, speaks of Perry’s oblique attack as “that which gallantry counselled rather than the more circuitous, perhaps more prudent, course” which would have taken Perry’s ship abreast of the British before running within gunshot. But when through gallantry he had lost his ship, practically, “and a less determined officer might have despaired of the day,” he “quit his own disabled ship for another” and “with consummate judgment and celerity, reformed the van of his squadron, composed of the heaviest ships, and not only retrieved his loss, but in a few minutes secured victory.” “This combination was most masterly,” says Ward, referring to what may be called Perry’s renewed attack. It was his gallantry combined with his splendid judgment and celerity of action that gave Perry enduring fame. The Battle of Lake Erie appealed to the sentiment as well as to the cold judgment of Perry’s countrymen, whether afloat or ashore, and now that more than eighty years have passed, his handling of the squadron, taking the battle as a whole, meets as hearty approval from naval officers as it did in the fall of 1813. Quite different were the conditions, under which Macdonough had to fight. The force of the enemy was superior, and he rightly chose to receive rather than make the attack. As Barclay, the British commander on Lake Erie, concentrated his power as much as possible, so did Macdonough when awaiting the enemy. His choice of positions in Plattsburg Bay far outweighed the moral advantage which the British had in making an attack. And the rare judgment which Macdonough showed in preparing for the emergencies of battle far outweighed in the end the superior force--the very greatly superior force which the British possessed in the concentration of their long guns on a frigate and a brig.