II. The law and constitution of England provide certain extraordinary revenues when the ordinary revenues should prove insufficient, and for the defense of the realm. Chief among these were the subsidies and aids which were granted in Parliament. That Parliament was the only body capable of levying these charges was exhibited by the fact that the kings of England were wont to denominate their arbitrary exactions as “loans” and “benevolences.” III. The statutes of the realm provided in most emphatic language that no tax should be levied on the subject without the consent of Parliament. The charter of the Conqueror, Magna Carta, especially Confirmatio Cartarum and De Tallagio non Concedendo, the statutes passed subsequently under Edward III, and more than all the others, the Petition of Right, showed the utter illegality of the ship money. IV. The citations by the crown of exactions similar to the ship money did not demonstrate the lawfulness of the demand; they merely showed precedents of such a general levy. The case must be decided by law, not by precedents,--“_judicandum est legibus non exemplis_.” V. In the present instance, the perils which the king cited were insufficient to justify an unusual demand for money. The precedent of the arbitrary actions of Queen Elizabeth at the time of the Armada could in no wise be taken as a justification for so great an exercise of the prerogative when the nation was at peace with the world; the piratical acts of Turkish corsairs or even the insolence of rival neighbors could not be reckoned amongst those imminent perils for which a Parliament could provide too tardily.[362] [A judgment for the crown] The judgment was in favor of the crown seven to five. Three of the minority based their decision upon the particular rather than on general grounds; Croke and Hutton, however, denied the general contention of the crown absolutely. Croke maintained that taxation save by authority of Parliament is contrary to the common law and to the statutes; that the exaction could not be defended upon the plea of imminent danger; and that the extension to inland counties was not legal or warranted by any legal precedent. The seven judges whose opinions were favorable to the king, upheld the prerogative of the crown as against the legislative power of Parliament. Sir John Finch, chief justice of the common pleas, stated their attitude clearly. “No act of Parliament,” he said, “can bar a king of his regality, as that no lands should hold of him, or bar him of the allegiance of his subjects or the relative on his part, as trust and power to defend his people; therefore acts of Parliament to take away his royal power in the defense of his kingdom are void; they are void acts of Parliament to bind the king not to command the subjects, their persons, and goods, and I say their money too; for no acts of Parliament make any difference.”[363]