back. This question of accommodation was as important as any tactical problem. There was no rest for troops in reserve; they were scarcely better off than those in the fighting. The organization of billeting during reliefs broke down. No provision was made for surplus personnel of incoming Divisions. As a result, each area became congested with their details, and other Divisions, when allotted such areas, found no accommodation left. Another great difficulty was the lack of tolerable roads. The work done upon the roads before and during the battle was insufficient to preserve them, but it had the effect of wearying the front-line troops. The preliminary work, the exposure, cold, dirt, lack of rest and hot food, told very speedily upon the health of the infantry engaged, and diminished its fighting value. The tanks were magnificent. They accomplished all that their commanders had promised. But their employment after the first day caused a tremendous strain upon their teams, which, when not fighting, were greasing and "tuning up." It is possible--though this is pure speculation--that the number used on November the 20th might have been reduced by a third, which would have left a really large reserve for subsequent operations. As it was, many tanks in the later stages of the battle broke down before reaching their starting line. And once more, in conclusion, we must pay our meed of praise to the German machine-gunner. Machine-gun battalions were reported by airmen to have detrained at Cambrai on the evening of the 20th. If so, these picked troops were doubtless in action all along the front the following day. It was machine-gun fire alone that delayed the British advance till fresh troops were on the ground to bring it to a halt. Of the German machine-gunners General Nugent wrote: "It is not too much to say that the failure of our offensive to achieve the objectives laid down, was entirely due to the devotion and fighting spirit of these troops of the enemy, practically unsupported by their own infantry and artillery, during the first forty-eight hours." This fact proved, if proof were needed, that no troops, however devoted, could, without mechanical assistance, face machine-guns being handled by really determined defenders. [Illustration: Map IV The Battle of Cambrai, 1917.] FOOTNOTES: [46] On the return of the 36th Division to the Cambrai area, the writer was informed that there was a dead German in Dessart Wood. The wood being ten thousand yards from the German line before the counter-attack, he found this hard to credit, and rode over to see. He could find no German. There were, however, undoubtedly some in Gouzeaucourt Wood, half-way between Metz and Gouzeaucourt. [47] O.C. 109th Machine-Gun Company. CHAPTER X THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE ON THE SOMME (I): JANUARY TO MARCH 22ND, 1918