“It was the Battle of Agagia,” General Peyton subsequently wrote, “which sealed the fate of the combined Turks and Senussi who had contemplated an attack on Egypt.” The possession of Barrani enabled us to bring to that port supplies by sea and to make of it a new advanced base. After the action at Halazin the 2nd South African Regiment had been employed in furnishing escorts for convoys between Matruh and Unjeila. This task was now accomplished, and by 8th March the 2nd and 4th Regiments had joined Lukin at Barrani, together with the rest of the 2nd Mounted Brigade and two sections of the Hong-Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery. After their defeat the Senussi had retreated westward towards Sollum, and the Egyptian Bedouin, notably the Aulad Ali tribes, began to desert in large numbers and sue for pardon. The time had not yet come, however, for negotiations. The enemy had occupied his old camp near Sollum, which had been the Grand Senussi’s headquarters before the campaign began, and there was the danger that he might receive reinforcements from Tripoli. It therefore behoved General Peyton to strike again without delay, and to clear Egyptian soil up to the frontier. * * * * * To Sollum there were two routes: one by the Khedival road along the coast, the other inland by the high ground of the plateau. For military purposes the latter was to be preferred, for the ridges rise steeply behind Sollum, and to attack the enemy’s camp from the coast would have been no light undertaking. It was better to move inland and come upon the Senussi from the south and south-east. The main problem, as in all desert warfare, was that of the water supply; but General Peyton’s intelligence led him to believe that there were sufficient wells by the inland route to supply his force if it moved in two parts and made careful use of its reserve water park. [Illustration: BARRANI TO SOLLUM.] [Sidenote: _Mar. 9._]