On the 5th the headquarters of the Divisional Artillery returned to the line, and on the 11th the 20th Division again relieved the 38th, and prepared to launch an attack on the 20th of the month, when the British offensive was being resumed on a front of eight miles, from the Ypres-Staden railway to the south. By the day of the attack the front line, which ran from a point on the road 1000 yards east of Langemarck in a north-westerly direction to the railway, was held by the 60th Brigade on the right and the 59th on the left; the 61st was in reserve. Divisional Headquarters was near Elverdinghe. All units had been very weak since the fighting at Langemarck, and even after they had had three weeks out of the line to refit, the average fighting strength of the battalions was only 350. The 51st Division of the XVIIIth Corps was on the right of the 20th, and the Guards on the left. The signal communications taken over from the 38th Division included a new buried cable in the much-shelled area between Langemarck and Au Bon Gite, but there was no buried line back to Stray Farm. The task of completing this bury across a mile of sodden and difficult ground was at once undertaken by the Signal Company, and successfully accomplished in time. The value of this work was proved in the course of the day’s fighting, when not only was signal communication maintained, but in addition to continual telephone calls, one thousand and ten telegrams were dealt with at the Divisional Signal Office. The objective in the forthcoming attack included ’t Goed ter Vesten Farm and the enemy trenches south-east of it; from the farm it ran west to the railway, involving on this flank only a short advance. On the right the attack was to be made in two bounds, but on the left there was an intricate network of trenches, which it was considered better to capture without any pause. The attack was preceded by a twenty-four hours’ hurricane bombardment, which started about 4 A.M. on the 19th, and during the action the usual creeping, standing, and smoke barrages were carried out, covering altogether a depth of 2500 yards. Half of the machine gun companies of the 60th and 59th Brigades were under their brigade commanders, the remaining two half companies being kept back as a reserve until the objective had been taken. The 61st and 217th Machine Gun Companies worked under the orders of the Divisional Machine Gun Officer. The night before the attack a direct hit on the headquarters of the 10th K.R.R.C. killed Lieut-Colonel Rixon, Capt. Wallington, and several others. Major Cockbum took over the command of the battalion. The operations began at 5.40 A.M. on the 20th of September.