The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and other essays in contemporary thoughtDewey, John
Philosophy
The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy, and other essays in contemporary thought
Dewey, John
Evolution; Philosophy; Pragmatism
Intelligence is, indeed, as you say, discrimination, distinction.
But why? Because we have to _act_ in order to keep secure amid the
moving flux of circumstance, some slight but precious good that Nature
has bestowed; and because, in order to act successfully, we must act
after conscious selection--after discrimination of means and ends.
Of course, all goods arrive, as Arthur says, as natural results, but
so do all bads, and all grades of good and bad. To label the results
that occur culminations, achievements, and then argue to a quasi-moral
constitution of Nature because she effects such results, is to employ
a logic which applies to the life-cycle of the germ that, in achieving
itself, kills man with malaria, as well as to the process of human
life that in reaching its fullness cuts short the germ-fulfilment. It
is putting the cart before the horse to say that because Nature is
so constituted as to produce results of all types of value, therefore
Nature is actuated by regard for differences of value, Nature, till it
produces a being who strives and who thinks in order that he may strive
more effectively, does not know whether it cares more for justice
or for cruelty, more for the ravenous wolf-like competition of the
struggle for existence, or for the improvements incidentally introduced
through that struggle. Literally it has no mind of its own. Nor would
the mere introduction of a consciousness that pictured indifferently
the scene out of which consciousness developed, add one iota of reason
for attributing eulogistically to Nature regard for value. But when the
sentient organism, having experienced natural values, good and bad,
begins to select, to prefer, and to make battle for its preference; and
in order that it may make the most gallant fight possible picks out
and gathers together in perception and thought what is favorable to
its aims and what hostile, then and there Nature has at last achieved
significant regard for good. And this is the same thing as the birth
of intelligence. For the holding an end in view and the selecting
and organizing out of the natural flux, on the basis of this end,
conditions that are means, _is_ intelligence. Not, then, when Nature
produces health or efficiency or complexity does Nature exhibit regard
for value, but only when it produces a living organism that has settled
preferences and endeavors. The mere happening of complexity, health,
adjustment, is all that Nature effects, as rightly called accident as
purpose. But when Nature produces an intelligence--ah, then, indeed
Nature has achieved something. Not, however, because this intelligence
impartially pictures the nature which has produced it, but because
in human consciousness Nature becomes genuinely partial. Because in
consciousness an end is preferred, is selected for maintenance, and
because intelligence pictures not a world just as it is _in toto_,
but images forth the conditions and obstacles of the continued
maintenance of the selected good.
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