IT is stated by Mr. Seymour that the character of the Society is in high esteem for morality at Rome. One of them said to him, “We have been charged with being crafty intriguers—with intermeddling in politics—with swaying princes—with disturbing kingdoms—with embroiling families. We have been charged with everything but one. No man has ever charged us with personal immorality.” And Mr. Seymour adds, that this boast is certainly true as respects the Jesuits of Rome; so true that whereas all men in that city hesitate not to denounce the other Monkish orders as idle, debauched, licentious, they never breathe a whisper against the personal morality of the Jesuits. If morality were confined to the absence of profligacy, I believe that the same might be said of the personal behaviour of the great majority of modern Jesuits; but if we take the term in its wider and nobler sense, as expressing the moral will of God, or the reflection of it in the moral sense, which still remains within the heart, notwithstanding our ruin in the fall: if morality convey to us the idea of purity, truth, honesty, justice, and all those noble principles which should regulate man’s intercourse with man, then I believe it may be shown to demonstration that the Order has sanctioned principles which are sufficient to dissolve every moral tie, and, if extensively prevalent, to break up the whole fabric of society. I do not mean that such principles are boldly stated in their Constitutions and public documents, for, of course, it would not answer their purpose to avow them. But they are maintained and defended by their most celebrated writers, and if we only bear in mind that no Jesuit is permitted to publish any book without first submitting it to his Superior, it is clear that the Society becomes responsible for every publication of its members. The leading principles of the Order strips the writer of his individuality, and every publication of every individual amongst them becomes an authorized document of the Society. It cannot go forth without the imprimatur of the General, and if it has that imprimatur, then the Society becomes responsible for its sentiments. {48} Let us take one or two specimens of their moral maxims. The reader has doubtless heard of the doctrine of Probability; the principle of which is, that if any writer of repute has recommended a certain conduct, then that conduct becomes probably right. If any author, especially any modern, has advanced a certain opinion, then that opinion becomes probable. It matters not what evidence there is against it. It may be condemned by the concurrent voice of all honest men, but still it is rendered probable if defended by a single individual.