But what results from this probability? and what harm is done if the opinion be accounted probable? It is really almost inconceivable that any men should have had the daring to advance such a maxim as may be found in countless passages in the writings of the Order. It is nothing less than this. That if any opinion be probable it may be adopted with a clear conscience, and if any action be probably right, a man may perform it and be harmless, whatever be its character. Mr. Dalton quotes the following passage, amongst many others, from George De Rhodes:{49}—“The authority of one good doctor is a sufficient reason on which to ground the probability of any opinion; _so that every one may safely follow it_.” Where, Oh, where is the vaunted certainty of Romish teaching? We hear of men seeking rest in Rome’s authority in order that their soul may be satisfied with certainty. And the human mind requires certainty; the interests of eternity are far too solemn to allow men to rest satisfied if their only hope be in a doubt or an opinion. But who, we may boldly challenge them to answer us, has the certainty now,—the poor unhappy man who is floating hither and thither on a whole sea of Jesuitical probabilities?—or the man who can plant his firm foot on the immoveable rock of the unchanging word of the living God, and fearlessly declare, “This is certain, because it is inspired; this is truth, because God has revealed it in the Bible?” It seems at first sight that such principles as these must lead to endless perplexity and embarrassment, and so they must if all love of truth be not first extinguished. But on the other hand it is clear that they give unbounded latitude in conduct, and by referring truth to the ever-varying standard of man’s opinion, enable the Jesuit to justify anything. Pascal puts this with great power in his “Provincial Letters.” He supposes a Jesuit father to be conversing with him as follows:—“They, the authors, are very often of different opinions; but that does not signify; every one renders his own probable and sure. We well know that they have not the same sentiments, it is all the better for that. On the contrary, they hardly ever agree. There are very few questions where you will not find that one says yes, and the other no. In all cases of that sort, one and the other of the contrary opinions is probable. But, my father, said I, we must be very much embarrassed in choosing! Not at all, said he, you have only to follow the one that pleases the most. What! if the other is more probable? It does not signify, said he. And if the other is more certain? It does not signify, repeated the father; here it is, well explained. It is Emmanuel Sa, of our Society, in his aphorism De Dubiis:—‘We may do what we think lawful according to a probable opinion, although the contrary may be more certain. The opinion of a grave doctor is sufficient.’ . . . We have certainly large scope,