The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
M^r King expressed his apprehensions that an extreme caution in favor of
liberty might enervate the Government we were forming. He wished the
House to recur to the primitive axiom that the three great departments
of Gov^{ts} should be separate & independent: that the Executive &
Judiciary should be so as well as the Legislative: that the Executive
should be so equally with the Judiciary. Would this be the case, if the
Executive should be impeachable? It had been said that the Judiciary
would be impeachable. But it should have been remembered at the same
time that the Judiciary hold their places not for a limited time, but
during good behaviour. It is necessary therefore that a form should be
established for trying misbehaviour. Was the Executive to hold his place
during good behaviour? The Executive was to hold his place for a limited
term like the members of the Legislature. Like them, particularly the
Senate whose members would continue in appointm^t the same term of 6
years he would periodically be tried for his behaviour by his electors,
who would continue or discontinue him in trust according to the manner
in which he had discharged it. Like them therefore, he ought to be
subject to no intermediate trial, by impeachment. He ought not to be
impeachable unless he held his office during good behavior, a tenure
which would be most agreeable to him; provided an independent and
effectual forum could be devised. But under no circumstances ought he to
be impeachable by the Legislature. This would be destructive of his
independence and of the principles of the Constitution. He relied on the
vigor of the Executive as a great security for the public liberties.
M^r Randolph. The propriety of impeachments was a favorite principle
with him. Guilt wherever found ought to be punished. The Executive will
have great opportunitys of abusing his power; particularly in time of
war when the military force, and in some respects the Public money will
be in his hands. Should no regular punishment be provided, it will be
irregularly inflicted by tumults & insurrections. He is aware of the
necessity of proceeding with a cautious hand, and of excluding as much
as possible the influence of the Legislature from the business. He
suggested for consideration an idea which had fallen (from Col.
Hamilton) of composing a forum out of the Judges belonging to the
States: and even of requiring some preliminary inquest whether just
ground of impeachment existed.
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