The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
Doct^r Franklin mentioned the case of the Prince of Orange during the
late war. An agreement was made between France & Holland; by which their
two fleets were to unite at a certain time & place. The Dutch fleet did
not appear. Every body began to wonder at it. At length it was suspected
that the Statholder was at the bottom of the matter. This suspicion
prevailed more & more. Yet as he could not be impeached and no regular
examination took place, he remained in his office, and strengthening his
own party, as the party opposed to him became formidable, he gave birth
to the most violent animosities & contentions. Had he been impeachable,
a regular & peaceable enquiry would have taken place and he would if
guilty have been duly punished, if innocent restored to the confidence
of the Public.
M^r King remarked that the case of the Statholder was not applicable. He
held his place for life, and was not periodically elected. In the former
case impeachments are proper to secure good behaviour. In the latter
they are unnecessary; the periodical responsibility to the electors
being an equivalent security.
M^r Wilson observed that if the idea were to be pursued, the Senators
who are to hold their places during the same term with the Executive,
ought to be subject to impeachment & removal.
M^r Pinkney apprehended that some gentlemen reasoned on a supposition
that the Executive was to have powers which would not be committed to
him: He presumed that his powers would be so circumscribed as to render
impeachments unnecessary.
M^r Gov^r Morris's opinion had been changed by the arguments used in the
discussion. He was now sensible of the necessity of impeachments, if the
Executive was to continue for any length of time in office. Our
Executive was not like a Magistrate having a life interest, much less
like one having an hereditary interest in his office. He may be bribed
by a greater interest to betray his trust; and no one would say that we
ought to expose ourselves to the danger of seeing the first Magistrate
in foreign pay, without being able to guard ag^{st} it by displacing
him. One would think the King of England well secured ag^{st} bribery.
He has as it were a fee simple in the whole Kingdom. Yet Charles II. was
bribed by Louis XIV. The Executive ought therefore to be impeachable for
treachery: Corrupting his electors, and incapacity were other causes of
impeachment. For the latter he should be punished not as a man, but as
an officer, and punished only by degradation from his office. This
Magistrate is not the King but the prime Minister. The people are the
King. When we make him amenable to Justice however we should take care
to provide some mode that will not make him dependent on the
Legislature.
It was moved & 2^{ded} to postpone the question of impeachments which
was negatived, Mas. & S. Carolina only being ay.
On y^e Question, Shall the Executive be removable on impeachments &c.?
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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