The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2Madison, James
History
The Journal of the Debates in the Convention which Framed the Constitution of the United States, May-September 1787. Volume 2
Madison, James
Constitutional law -- United States; Constitutions -- United States; United States. Constitution
JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION OF 1787.
THURSDAY JULY 19. IN CONVENTION.
On reconsideration of the vote rendering the Executive re-eligible a 2^d
time, M^r Martin moved to re-instate the words, "to be ineligible a 2^d
time."
M^r Governeur Morris. It is necessary to take into one view all that
relates to the establishment of the Executive; on the due formation of
which must depend the efficacy & utility of the Union among the present
and future States. It has been a maxim in Political Science that
Republican Government is not adapted to a large extent of Country,
because the energy of the Executive Magistracy can not reach the extreme
parts of it. Our Country is an extensive one. We must either then
renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive with
sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it. This subject was of so
much importance that he hoped to be indulged in an extensive view of it.
One great object of the Executive is to controul the Legislature. The
Legislature will continually seek to aggrandize & perpetuate themselves;
and will seize those critical moments produced by war, invasion or
convulsion for that purpose. It is necessary then that the Executive
Magistrate should be the guardian of the people, even of the lower
classes, ag^{st} Legislative tyranny, against the Great & the wealthy
who in the course of things will necessarily compose the Legislative
body. Wealth tends to corrupt the mind to nourish its love of power, and
to stimulate it to oppression. History proves this to be the spirit of
the opulent. The check provided in the 2^d branch was not meant as a
check on Legislative usurpations of power, but on the abuse of lawful
powers, on the propensity in the 1^{st} branch to legislate too much to
run into projects of paper money & similar expedients. It is no check on
Legislative tyranny. On the contrary it may favor it, and if the 1^{st}
branch can be seduced may find the means of success. The Executive
therefore ought to be so constituted as to be the great protector of the
Mass of the people.--It is the duty of the Executive to appoint the
officers & to command the forces of the Republic: to appoint 1.
ministerial officers for the administration of public affairs. 2.
officers for the dispensation of Justice. Who will be the best Judges
whether these appointments be well made? The people at large, who will
know, will see, will feel the effects of them. Again who can judge so
well of the discharge of military duties for the protection & security
of the people, as the people themselves who are to be protected &
secured? He finds too that the Executive is not to be re-eligible. What
effect will this have? 1. it will destroy the great incitement to merit
public esteem by taking away the hope of being rewarded with a
reappointment. It may give a dangerous turn to one of the strongest
passions in the human breast.
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