The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War, 1793-1815 — John Shaqi
The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War, 1793-1815Mockler-Ferryman, A. F. (Augustus Ferryman)
History
The Life of a Regimental Officer During the Great War, 1793-1815
Mockler-Ferryman, A. F. (Augustus Ferryman)
Great Britain -- History -- 1789-1820; Rice, Samuel, 1775-1840
It is, however, quite certain that when the 51st regiment went on
service in 1793, its general condition left nothing to be desired,
since Moore had paid attention to such weeding-out of officers as was
necessary when he first took up the command in 1790, and all young
officers who joined afterwards were kept under his ever-watchful eye
until he was sure of them. "He felt that a perfect knowledge and an
exact performance of the humble, but important duties of a subaltern
officer, are the best foundations for subsequent military fame";[13]
and he required from his officers a punctilious attention to duty
and a thorough knowledge of their profession, so that they might be
looked up to and respected by the soldiers whom they were called upon
to command. And, a perfect gentleman himself, he had no place in the
51st for any officer who was not the same. He was not a martinet, and
he did not ride rough-shod over his officers and men, but he knew
exactly when the occasion demanded a right enforcement of discipline,
and when discipline could be relaxed without detriment to the
"machine," which he proudly described, in September 1793, as being in
as good order as he could get it.
So much has been said here of Colonel Moore's characteristics,[14]
because he was Sam Rice's first commanding officer, and because
his teachings left their mark upon the man who served continuously
with Moore's old regiment for thirty-eight years. To return to
affairs in the Mediterranean: Colonel Moore, as senior officer with
the reinforcements which joined Lord Hood's fleet in Hyères Bay,
immediately went on board the _Victory_, and reported his arrival to
the Admiral, who somewhat churlishly remarked that the reinforcements
were meagre and had arrived too late to be of any use. He forgot
that the delay was due to dilatoriness on the part of his own naval
officers, and he forgot also that had the reinforcements arrived a
fortnight earlier, they could not have prevented the evacuation of
Toulon, since, on the 16th December, the enemy had captured the forts
which dominated the anchorage of the British fleet.
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