The Control, when first established, simply meant that Egypt should go into liquidation, and pay so much in the pound to its creditors, a couple of European controllers with half a dozen clerks, being appointed by the Egyptian Government to receive the composition from the Egyptian Treasury, and to hand it over to the various classes of bondholders. To this there could have been no sort of objection; but, little by little, this simple and semi-private arrangement was converted into a so-called international obligation on the part of the Egyptians to remain eternally divested from all control over their own expenditure, and to allow their entire financial administration to be placed in the hands of about 1300 Europeans, with salaries amounting to nearly £400,000 per annum, whilst the Controllers themselves had seats in the Cabinet, with a veto upon everything proposed by their Egyptian colleagues. France and England were the executive officers of this scheme. If the Egyptian officers had assented to it, nothing further was to be said, except that they were singularly and curiously wanting in patriotism. However we find now that they did not, and that we have been under an illusion. The Notables and the entire country were--to their credit be it said--opposed to it. Arabi took advantage of this feeling. He sided with the country, and at the same time made his bargain. "I," he practically said to the Notables, "support you in your rights; as a _quid pro quo_ you must support me in what I am pleased to call the rights of the army--that is to say, that it shall be increased by 18,000 men." Without the army the Notables were powerless; they accordingly accepted the terms. We therefore find ourselves in the position that we were fully justified in asserting that Arabi was a self-seeking military adventurer, but that he was also the exponent of the legitimate {203} demands of the Egyptian people. The Control had become political--it was no longer a reasonable financial arrangement, but an unreasonable and improper attempt to deprive the Egyptians of their rights, in order to secure high salaries for a swarm of European locusts, and certainty of interest to European bond-holders. Those, therefore, who had regarded it in its natural original conception, as fair and useful, have a perfect right to assert that this original conception had been so perverted that it had become a monstrous instrument for the suppression of all national vitality. We, however, were tied to France. If we had not interfered, France probably would have done so. Moreover, we foolishly had pledged ourselves to maintain the Khedive in his position. The only way, therefore, to get out of the complication was to cut the Gordian knot; but, in order to do this, we were necessarily obliged to adopt the theory that Arabi was a mere military adventurer, who was attempting for his own ends to coerce not only the Khedive but the Egyptian people.