_A._ Nor second either in the things we speak of; But thus it is—if to an even number, Or e’en an odd one, if you so prefer it, You add a unit, or if you deduct one, Say will the number still remain the same? _B._ Certainly not. _A._ So, if you take a measure A cubit long, and add another cubit, Or cut a portion off, the measure then No longer is the same? _B._ Of course it is not. _A._ Now turn your eyes and thoughts upon mankind— We see one grows, another perishes So that they all exist perpetually In a condition of transition. That Whose nature changes must be different At each successive moment, from the thing It was before. So also, you and I Are different people now from what we were But yesterday; and then, again, to-morrow We shall be different from what we’re now; So that, by the same rule, we’re always different. And Alcimus speaks as follows:—“The wise men say that the soul perceives some things by means of the body, as for instance, when it hears and sees; but that it also perceives something by its own power, without availing itself at all of the assistance of the body.” On which account existent things are divisible into objects of sensation and objects of understanding. On account of which Plato used to say, that those who wished to become acquainted with the principles of everything, ought first of all to divide the ideas as he calls them, separately, such as similarity, and unity, and multitude, and magnitude, and stationariness, and motion. And secondly, that they ought to form a notion of the honourable and the good, and the just, and things of that sort, by themselves, apart from other considerations. And thirdly, that they ought to ascertain the character of such ideas as are relative to one another, such as knowledge, or magnitude, or authority; considering that the things which come under our notice from partaking of their nature, have the same names that they have. I mean that one calls that just which partakes of the just; and that beautiful which partakes of the beautiful. And each of these primary species is eternal, and is to be understood by the intellect, and is not subject to the influence of external circumstances. On which account he says, that ideas exist in nature as models; and that all other things are like them, and, as it were, copies of them. Accordingly Epicharmus speaks thus about the good, and about the ideas. _A._ Tell me, is flute-playing now a thing at all? _B._ Of course it is. _A._ Is man then flute-playing? _B._ No, nothing of the sort. _A._ Well, let us see— What is a flute-player? what think you now Of him—is he a man, or is he not? _B._ Of course he is a man.