The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
If we will introduce such a balance of pleasure and pain
the individual must make the calculation for himself. The
supposition is that total ruin is very painful, partial loss
painful in a less proportion than that assigned by the ratio
of the losses themselves; the inference is therefore drawn
that on the average more pain is caused by occasional great
losses than by frequent small ones, though the money value
of the losses in the long run may be the same in each case.
But if we suppose a country where the desire of spending
largely is very strong, and where owing to abundant production
loss is easily replaced, the calculation might incline the
other way. Under such circumstances it is quite possible
that more happiness might result from playing for high than
for low stakes. The fact is that all emotional considerations
of this kind are irrelevant; they are, at most, mere applications
of the theory, and such as each individual is alone
competent to make for himself. Some more remarks will be
made upon this subject in the chapter upon Insurance and
Gambling.
30. It is by the introduction of such considerations as
these that the Petersburg Problem has been so perplexed.
Having already given some description of this problem we
will refer to it very briefly here. It presents us with a
sequence of sets of throws for each of which sets I am to
receive something, say a shilling, as the minimum receipt.
My receipts increase in proportion to the rarity of each
particular kind of set, and each kind is observed or inferred
to grow more rare in a certain definite but unlimited order.
By the wording of the problem, properly interpreted, I am
supposed never to stop. Clearly therefore, however large a
fee I pay for each of these sets, I shall be sure to make it up
in time. The mathematical expression of this is, that I
ought always to pay an infinite sum. To this the objection
is opposed, that no sensible man would think of advancing
even a large finite sum, say £50. Certainly he would not;
but why? Because neither he nor those who are to pay
him would be likely to live long enough for him to obtain
throws good enough to remunerate him for one-tenth of his
outlay; to say nothing of his trouble and loss of time. We
must not suppose that the problem, as stated in the ideal
form, will coincide with the practical form in which it
presents itself in life. A carpenter might as well object to
Euclid's second postulate, because his plane came to a stop
in six feet on the plank on which he was at work. Many
persons have failed to perceive this, and have assumed that,
besides enabling us to draw numerical inferences about the
members of a series, the theory ought also to be called upon
to justify all the opinions which average respectable men
might be inclined to form about them, as well as the conduct
they might choose to pursue in consequence. It is obvious
that to enter upon such considerations as these is to diverge
from our proper ground.
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