The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
10. We may now see clearly the reasons for the
limits within which causation[3] is necessarily required, but
beyond which it is not needed. To be able to generalize
a formula so as to extend it from the observed to the unobserved,
it is clearly essential that there should be a certain
permanence in the order of nature; this permanence is one
form of what is implied in the term causation. If the
circumstances under which men live and die remaining the
same, we did not feel warranted in inferring that four men
out of ten would continue to live to fifty, because in the case
of those whom we had observed this proportion had hitherto
done so, it is clear that we should be admitting that the
same antecedents need not be followed by the same consequents.
This uniformity being what the Law of Causation
asserts, the truth of the law is clearly necessary to enable us
to obtain our generalizations: in other words, it is necessary
for the Inductive part of the process. But it seems to be
equally clear that causation is not necessary for that part of
the process which belongs to Probability. Provided only
that the truth of our generalizations is secured to us, in the
way just mentioned, what does it matter to us whether or
not the individual members are subject to causation? For
it is not in reality about these individuals that we make
inferences. As this last point has been already fully treated
in Chapter VI., any further allusion to it need not be made here.
11. The above description, or rather indication, of the
process of obtaining these generalizations must suffice for the
present. Let us now turn and consider the means by which
we are practically to make use of them when they are obtained.
The point which we had reached in the course of the
investigations entered into in the sixth and seventh chapters
was this:--Given a series of a certain kind, we could draw
inferences about the members which composed it; inferences,
that is, of a peculiar kind, the value and meaning of which
were fully discussed in their proper place.
We must now shift our point of view a little; instead of
starting, as in the former chapters, with a determinate series
supposed to be given to us, let us assume that the individual
only is given, and that the work is imposed upon us of finding
out the appropriate series. How are we to set about the
task? In the former case our data were of this kind:--Eight
out of ten men, aged fifty, will live eleven years more,
and we ascertained in what sense, and with what certainty,
we could infer that, say, John Smith, aged fifty, would live
to sixty-one.
12. Let us then suppose, instead, that John Smith
presents himself, how should we in this case set about obtaining
a series for him? In other words, how should we
collect the appropriate statistics? It should be borne in
mind that when we are attempting to make real inferences
about things as yet unknown, it is in this form that the
problem will practically present itself.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account