The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
It must be admitted that some ground has been given
for such an opinion. The examples commonly selected by
writers on the subject, though very well adapted to illustrate
its rules, are for the most part of a special and peculiar
character, such as those relating to dice and cards. When
they have searched for illustrations drawn from the practical
business of life, they have very generally, but unfortunately,
hit upon just the sort of instances which, as I shall endeavour
to show hereafter, are among the very worst that could
be chosen for the purpose. It is scarcely possible for any
unprejudiced person to read what has been written about the
credibility of witnesses by eminent writers, without his experiencing
an invincible distrust of the principles which they
adopt. To say that the rules of evidence sometimes given
by such writers are broken in practice, would scarcely be
correct; for the rules are of such a kind as generally to defy
any attempt to appeal to them in practice.
This supposed want of harmony between Probability and
other branches of Philosophy is perfectly erroneous. It
arises from the belief that Probability is a branch of mathematics
trying to intrude itself on to ground which does not
altogether belong to it. I shall endeavour to show that this
belief is unfounded. To answer correctly the sort of questions
to which the science introduces us does generally demand
some knowledge of mathematics, often a great knowledge,
but the discussion of the fundamental principles on which
the rules are based does not necessarily require any such
qualification. Questions might arise in other sciences, in
Geology, for example, which could only be answered by the
aid of arithmetical calculations. In such a case any one
would admit that the arithmetic was extraneous and accidental.
However many questions of this kind there might
be here, those persons who do not care to work out special
results for themselves might still have an accurate knowledge
of the principles of the science, and even considerable
acquaintance with the details of it. The same holds true in
Probability; its connection with mathematics, though certainly
far closer than that of most other sciences, is still of
much the same kind. It is principally when we wish to
work out results for ourselves that mathematical knowledge
is required; without such knowledge the student may still
have a firm grasp of the principles and even see his way to
many of the derivative results.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account