The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
The above is the most comprehensive form of description;
as a matter of fact the groups will in many cases take a
far simpler form; they may appear, e.g. simply as a succession
of things of the same kind, say human beings, with
or without an occasional attribute, say that of being left-handed.
We are using the word attribute, of course, in its
widest sense, intending it to include every distinctive feature
that can be observed in a thing, from essential qualities
down to the merest accidents of time and place.
7. On examining our series, therefore, we shall find
that it may best be conceived, not necessarily as a succession
of events happening in different ways, but as a succession
of groups of things. These groups, on being analysed, are
found in every case to be resolvable into collections of substances
and attributes. That which gives its unity to the
succession of groups is the fact of some of these substances or
attributes being common to the whole succession; that which
gives their distinction to the groups in the succession is the
fact of some of them containing only a portion of these substances
and attributes, the other portion or portions being
occasionally absent. So understood, our phraseology may
be made to embrace every class of things of which Probability
can take account.
8. It will be easily seen that the ordinary expression
(viz. the 'event,' and the 'way in which it happens') may be
included in the above. When the occasional attributes are
unimportant the permanent ones are sufficient to fix and
appropriate the name, the presence or absence of the others
being simply denoted by some modification of the name or
the addition of some predicate. We may therefore in all such
cases speak of the collection of attributes as 'the event,'--the
same event essentially, that is--only saying that _it_ (so as
to preserve its nominal identity) happens in different ways
in the different cases. When the occasional attributes however
are important, or compose the majority, this way of
speaking becomes less appropriate; language is somewhat
strained by our implying that two extremely different assemblages
are in reality the same event, with a difference only
in its mode of happening. The phrase is however a very
convenient one, and with this caution against its being misunderstood,
it will frequently be made use of here.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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