The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
Recall for a moment what are the essentials of modality.
These I understand to be the attempt to mark off from one
another, without any resort to numerical notation, varying
degrees of conviction or belief, and to determine the consequent
effect of premises, thus affected, upon our conclusions.
Moreover, as we cannot construct or retain a scale of any
kind without employing a standard from and by which to
measure it, the attainment and recognition of a standard of
certainty, or of one of the other degrees of conviction, is
almost inseparably involved in the same enquiry. In this
sense of the term, modal difficulties have certainly shown
themselves in the department of Law. There have been
similar attempts here, encountered by similar difficulties, to
come to some definite agreement as to a scale of arrangement
of the degrees of our assent. It is of course much
more practicable to secure such agreement in the case of a
special science, confined more or less to the experts, than in
subjects into which all classes of outsiders have almost equal
right of entry. The range of application under the former
circumstances is narrower, and the professional experts have
acquired habits and traditions by which the standards may
be retained in considerable integrity. It does not appear,
however, according to all accounts, as if any very striking
success had been attained in this direction by the lawyers.
28. The difficulty in its scientific, or strictly jurisprudential
shape, seems to have shown itself principally in the
attempt to arrange legal evidence into classes in respect of
the degree of its cogency. This, I understand, was the case
in the Roman law, and in some of the continental systems of
jurisprudence which took their rise from the Roman law.
"The direct evidence of so many witnesses was _plena probatio_.
Then came _minus plena probatio_, then _semiplenâ
major_ and _semiplenâ minor_; and by adding together a
certain number of half-proofs--for instance, by the production
of a tradesman's account-books, _plus_ his supplementary
oath--full proof might be made out. It was on
this principle that torture was employed to obtain a confession.
The confession was evidence suppletory to the circumstances
which were held to justify its employment."[21]
According to Bentham,[22] the corresponding scale in the
English school was:--Positive proof, Violent presumption.
Probable presumption, Light or Rash presumption. Though
admitted by Blackstone and others, I understand that these
divisions are not at all generally accepted at the present
day.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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