The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics — John Shaqi
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
Now if all deflections from a mean were brought about in
the way just indicated (an indication which must suffice for
the present) we should always have one and the same law of
arrangement of frequency for these deflections or errors, viz.
the exponential[11] law mentioned in §5.
10. It may be readily admitted from what we know
about the production of events that something resembling
these assumptions, and therefore something resembling the
consequences which follow from them, is really secured in a
very great number of cases. But although this may prevail
approximately, it is in the highest degree improbable that it
could ever be secured, even artificially, with anything approaching
to rigid accuracy. For one thing, the causes of
deflection will seldom or never be really independent of one
another. Some of them will generally be of a kind such that
the supposition that several are swaying in one direction,
may affect the capacity of each to produce that full effect
which it would have been capable of if it had been left to do
its work alone. In the common example, for instance, of
firing at a mark, so long as we consider the case of the tolerably
good shots the effect of the wind (one of the causes of
error) will be approximately the same whatever may be the
precise direction of the bullet. But when a shot is considerably
wide of the mark the wind can no longer be regarded as
acting at right angles to the line of flight, and its effect in
consequence will not be precisely the same as before. In
other words, the causes here are not strictly independent, as
they were assumed to be; and consequently the results to be
attributed to each are not absolutely uninfluenced by those
of the others. Doubtless the effect is trifling here, but I
apprehend that if we were carefully to scrutinize the modes
in which the several elements of the total cause conspire
together, we should find that the assumption of absolute
independence was hazardous, not to say unwarrantable, in a
very great number of cases. These brief remarks upon the
process by which the deflections are brought about must
suffice for the present purpose, as the subject will receive a
fuller investigation in the course of the next chapter.
According, therefore, to the best consideration which
can at the present stage be afforded to this subject, we may
draw a similar conclusion from this deductive line of argument
as from the direct appeal to statistics. The same
general result seems to be established; namely, that approximately,
with sufficient accuracy for all practical purposes, we
may say that an examination of the causes by which the
deflections are generally brought about shows that they are
mostly of such a character as would result in giving us the
commonly accepted 'Law of Error,' as it is termed.[12] The
two lines of enquiry, therefore, within the limits assigned,
afford each other a decided mutual confirmation.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account