The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
19. The results of the last two chapters may be
summed up as follows:--We have extended the conception
of a series obtained in the first chapter; for we have found
that these series are mostly presented to us in groups.
These groups are found upon examination to be formed upon
approximately the same type throughout a very wide and
varied range of experience; the causes of this agreement we
discussed and explained in some detail. When, however, we
extend our examination by supposing the series to run to a
very great length, we find that they may be divided into two
classes separated by important distinctions. In one of these
classes (that containing the results of games of chance) the
conditions of production, and consequently the laws of statistical
occurrence, may be practically regarded as absolutely
fixed; and the extent of the divergences from the mean
seem to know no finite limit. In the other class, on the
contrary (containing the bulk of ordinary statistical enquiries),
the conditions of production vary with more or less rapidity,
and so in consequence do the results. Moreover it is often
impossible that variations from the mean should exceed a
certain amount. The former we may term _ideal_ series. It
is they alone which show the requisite characteristics with
any close approach to accuracy, and to make the theory of
the subject tenable, we have really to substitute one of this
kind for one of the less perfect ones of the other class, when
these latter are under treatment. The former class have,
however, been too exclusively considered by writers on the
subject; and conceptions appropriate only to them, and not
always even to them, have been imported into the other
class. It is in this way that a general tendency to an excessive
deductive or _à priori_ treatment of the science has
been encouraged.
1. This latter enquiry belongs to what may be termed the more purely
logical part of this volume, and is entered on in the course of
Chapter VI.
2. For the use of those not acquainted with the common notation
employed in this subject, it may be remarked that HH is simply an
abbreviated way of saying that the two successive throws of the
penny give head; HT that the first of them gives head, and the
second tail; and so on with the remaining symbols.
3. I am endeavouring to treat this rule of Sufficient Reason in a way
that shall be legitimate in the opinion of those who accept it, but
there seem very great doubts whether a contradiction is not involved
when we attempt to extract results from it. If the sides are
absolutely alike, how can there he any difference between the terms
of the series? The succession seems then reduced to a dull
uniformity, a mere iteration of the same thing many times; the
series we contemplated has disappeared. If the sides are not
absolutely alike, what becomes of the applicability of the rule?
4. _Formal Logic_, p. 185. _Principles of Science_, p. 208.
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