The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to StatisticsVenn, John
Philosophy
The Logic of Chance, 3rd edition: An Essay on the Foundations and Province of the Theory of Probability, With Especial Reference to Its Logical Bearings and Its Application to Moral and Social Science and to Statistics
Venn, John
Chance; Logic, Symbolic and mathematical; Probabilities; Science -- Methodology
It may be remarked that wherever any serious practical
consequences turn upon duly securing the desired randomness,
it is always so contrived that no design or awkwardness
or unconscious one-sidedness shall disturb the result. The
principal case in point here is of course afforded by games of
chance. What we want, when we toss a die, is to secure that
all numbers from 1 to 6 shall be equally often represented in
the long run, but that no person shall be able to predict the
individual occurrence. We might, in our statement of a
problem, as easily postulate 'a number _thought of_ at random'
as 'a shot fired at random', but no one would risk his chances
of gain and loss on the supposition that this would be done
with continued fairness. Accordingly, we construct a die
whose sides are accurately alike, and it is found that we may
do almost what we like with this, at any previous stage to
that of its issue from the dice box on to the table, without
interfering with the random nature of the result.
6. II. Another characteristic in which the scientific
conception seems to me to depart from the popular or original
signification is the following. The area of distribution which
we take into account must be a finite or limited one. The
necessity for this restriction may not be obvious at first sight,
but the consideration of one or two examples will serve to
indicate the point at which it makes itself felt. Suppose
that one were asked to choose a number at random, not
from a finite range, but from the inexhaustible possibilities
of enumeration. In the popular sense of the term,--i.e. of
uttering a number without pausing to choose,--there is no
difficulty. But a moment's consideration will show that no
arrangement even tending towards ultimately uniform distribution
can be secured in this way. No _average_ could be
struck with ever increasing steadiness. So with spatial
infinity. We can rationally speak of choosing a point at
random in a given straight line, area, or volume. But if we
suppose the line to have no end, or the selection to be made
in infinite space, the basis of ultimate tendency towards
what may be called the equally thick deposit of our random
points fails us utterly.
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