The logic of modern physicsBridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Philosophy
The logic of modern physics
Bridgman, P. W. (Percy Williams)
Physics -- Philosophy
Apart from the question of convenience, there may be justification in
continuing to use our old mechanical forms of thought if new
experimental relations are thereby suggested. That a very large number
of such as yet undiscovered relations may be suggested in some such way
is at once evident. Thus we have no present knowledge of any phenomenon
associated with what the electron does when passing from one energy
level to another. How long does it take to make the passage? What is its
path during passage? Is it subject to the ordinary laws of
electrodynamics during passage? When and where is the radiation emitted
that corresponds to passage? When the electron leaves one stable orbit
is the orbit on which it will eventually land already determined? Does
the radiation train emitted during a change from one energy level to
another have a definite length in space, or may it have a variable
length and correspondingly something that corresponds to variable
amplitude? What happens to the radiation when the electron passages are
interfered with before the emission of a quantum has been completed?
What is the mechanism by which the quantum conditions are imposed? Is it
not possible that part of the clew to the riddle of the manner of
transition from purely quantum behavior to the behavior of classical
mechanics may be found in the behavior of the electron during passage
from one energy level to another? Certainly we have a tendency to the
classical behavior under those conditions, such as at high temperature
or in strongly condensed systems, in which the time occupied in passage
might be expected to become a more important part of the total time.
Corresponding to these questions there should be many as yet
undiscovered phenomena, and the mechanical point of view therefore has
its value in suggesting experiments to detect such effects. It is of
course too early to see what the final result will be here; we cannot
tell whether eventually enough new experimental kinds of behavior will
be found to restore the number of independent concepts to that of the
level of ordinary experience or not, or whether indeed it will turn out
that a greater number of concepts is required. It is contrary to our
instincts to expect a greater number, and a smaller number now seems to
us not unnatural, but the considerations of this essay should prepare us
for either possibility.
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