Moreover, Germany and Austria were, until the beginning of 1918, ever able to send troops to the Balkans with much greater facility and speed than we could. Even Turkey might have sent reinforcements to Macedonia by rail; but Germany did not wish to make use of this assistance, because the Bulgarians were jealous of Turkish co-operation in a country like Macedonia, which until a few years ago had formed part of the Ottoman Empire. The number of the enemy’s field and mountain guns was slightly inferior to that of the Allies, but they were much stronger in medium and heavy calibre guns; they also had a number of guns of greater calibre and range than anything of which we could boast, and they kept their forces on the Macedonian front supplied with their best and most up-to-date material, whereas the Allies neglected theirs. The enemy defences, which were rudimentary at first, were gradually perfected until they came to constitute a system of really formidable fortifications, especially in the Monastir area, Hill 1050, and the sector west of Lake Doiran. Opposite the Serbian area and in certain other sectors there were fewer artificial defences, but the enemy positions were there, as indeed along almost the whole of the front, infinitely superior to ours. In the Italian sector, as we shall see, the summits of the ridge were all in the hands of the enemy, by whom our lines of access were to a large extent dominated; the same conditions existed opposite the II Serbian Army (Dobropolje-Vetrenik area) and opposite the British, west of Lake Doiran. It should always be borne in mind that the war in Macedonia, owing to the nature of the country in which the operations took place, the scarcity of railways, roads and resources, the pestilent climate, the sparse population and the great distances which separated us from our centres of supplies, was essentially a colonial campaign. But the Germans, and the Bulgars organized and trained by the Germans, had all the means and materials of modern war at their disposal. During the early days of the expedition the Allied Command was not even provided with staff officers who were well acquainted with modern warfare, and the material means which the armies received from Europe were of inferior quality. The C.A.A. never attributed sufficient weight to these difficulties. CHAPTER III THE COMMAND OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN THE ORIENT. THE FRENCH TROOPS.